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 “The people of South Africa are the Parliament, which is why it is called the “People’s 
Parliament”. … The people you voted for are accountable to you, as it is you who elected 
them.  It is their duty to listen to your opinions and needs. They must make sure the views 
of the voters are taken into account when they vote for laws. And they must report the 
decisions of Parliament back to you, the people.  Everything they do and say must be open 
so that you, the voter can know what decisions are being made. So the people actively 
working for Parliament are there because the people of South Africa have put them 
there.  And it is their duty to work for and represent every citizens [sic] of South Africa.”1 
 
This paper assesses the political impact of the constitutional framework and policy for public 
participation in South Africa. I consider the question of how legislatures are fulfilling their 
obligations to facilitate public participation, if they meet international human rights law (IHRL) 
norms and the extent to which the public involvement facilitated by legislatures measures up to 
standards identified by theories of political participation. Central to this is a discussion of whether 
government-led citizen participation processes influence, or have the potential to influence, state 
decision-making. I examine the political tensions that arise between public participation and party 
politics within the context of South Africa’s political system and discuss the role of civil society-led 
participation, and the interactions and conflicts between this and the government facilitated 
processes. 
 
The role and value of the legislatures 
  
Parliament is entrenched as the centre of South Africa’s democracy in Chapter 4 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). It provides the framework 
for a National Assembly (NA) to “ensure government by the people under the Constitution” and it 
goes further to note that “It does this by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for 
public consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive 
action.”2 The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is also required to provide ‘a national forum 
for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces.’3 The National Development Plan 2030 
echoes the constitutional mandate, stating that their role is ‘to champion the concerns of 
citizens’.4 The NDP recognises the legislatures’ role in our democracy, towards ‘building an 
                                                        
1 Quoted from the Website of the Parliament of South Africa. Accessed at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=14 on 24 February 2014 
2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 108 of 1996. s42(3) 
3 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 108 of 1996. s42(4) 
4 National Development Plan 2030: Our future – make it work. 2012. National Planning Commission. P428. 
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accountable and responsive state’. It notes that strong legislatures are essential for oversight and 
accountability of the executive by ensuring ‘that questions get asked when things go wrong’, and 
it describes their role to ensure that there is rigourous debate on policies.5 In addition, it 
recognises that there is a ‘crucial role for Parliament…. in enabling public participation’ within our 




Key to the discussion on the state of public participation in South Africa’s legislatures is the issue 
of our democratic system. South Africa’s democracy is based on a closed-list proportional 
representation system, which means that, at a national and provincial level, citizens vote for the 
party and the party decides who will be appointed as members of Parliament (MPs) or members 
of the provincial legislatures (MPLs).7 While this system safeguards the election of a diversity of 
representatives, its downside is that citizens do not vote directly for their representatives, and 
thus the representatives do not account directly to voters, but rather to the party that has given 
them a place on the party list.8 This acts as a disincentive for elected representatives to act 
independently; either in responding to the will of citizens where this conflicts with the positions of 
their party, 9 or in terms of their mandate to exercise oversight and hold the executive to account, 
which practically speaking means critiquing senior members of their party.10 The problems that 
arise from this system are exacerbated by the dominance of a single political party at the polls.11 
 
Friedman argues that in spite of this context, parliament has seen some strongly independent 
committees and committee chairpersons at times, but that this independence has frequently also 
resulted in their removal from parliament. He explains that the African National Congress’ (ANC) 
reasoning for removing a number of committee chairpersons in 2010 was that these chairpersons 
‘were not showing enough respect for ministers’.12 The emergence of strong factions within the 
ANC since 2007 increased the independence of ANC members during a period of a few years, but 
Friedman stresses that indications of independence were not entirely the result of these rifts in 
the ruling party.13 Van der Westhuizen also highlights instances in which committees and MPs 
have flexed their constitutional muscle over the executive with positive effects, but comes to the 
                                                        
5 National Development Plan 2030: Our future – make it work. 2012. National Planning Commission. (NDP) P428. 
6 NDP. 2012. ibid. P408.  
7 Report of the Electoral Task Team. 2003. P1  
8 Report of the Electoral Task Team. 2003. P29 ; and Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament. 2009. 
(RIPAP) Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. P8 
9 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P8  
10 Van der Westhuizen C. 2014. Working democracy: Perspectives on South Africa’s Parliament  at 20 years. P38; and 
RIPAP. 2009 ibid. P37 
11 Friedman S. 2012. ‘Fiercely (In-)dependent: South Africa’s Parliament. Perspectives 2:12, 13-15. P 13; and RIPAP. 
2009. Ibid. P37 
12 Friedman. 2012. Ibid. P14  
13 Friedman. 2012. Ibid. P15 
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same conclusion that while this has had positive impact in isolated cases and in the short term, in 
the long run it results in the removal of these MPs from their parliamentary positions.14  
 
As a consequence, significant questions persist regarding the will and capacity of the elected 
representatives to perform their functions of law making, representivity and oversight 
independently of political parties,15 and regarding their lack of accountability to the voting 
public.16 This context raises critical questions around parliament’s mandate in terms of the 
Constitution – are decisions that should be taken in parliament, in reality, being taken by political 
parties and sent to parliament to be ‘rubber stamped’?17 The impact of this weakness of the 
legislatures, is that they are failing to meet citizen expectations, thus citizens question the 
legislatures’ credibility and have expressed significant mistrust in elected representatives.18 
“Come to parliament and become a professional puppet” read one protestor’s placard outside 
parliament on 25 February 2014.19 “Its not a people’s parliament, it’s a parties’ parliament” 
opined a conference participant at the People’s Power, People’s Parliament Conference.20 
 
To achieve accountability of the executive it is essential that MPs play a stronger leadership role 
to challenge and hold the executive to account. This scrutiny is essential to ensure accountability 
on the redistribution of resources and the provision of public services and to address 
mismanagement and corruption. A quote by a previous senior MP illustrates the frustrations MPs 
face in relation to this: 
 
“I think when we look at the issue of the relationship between committees and the 
Executive, it’s essentially a matter of power. …  it’s about power and whose views prevail. 
According to my experience…it tends to be the view of the executive that prevails. … when 
I came to Parliament I served in one committee for six years. I left it because I was sick and 
tired of wasting my time because the minister won’t listen”.21 
 
In her assessment of the performance of Parliament over a 20-year period, van der Westhuizen 
provides numerous of examples of executive dominance over the legislatures’ territory, relating 
to both Parliament’s oversight and law-making functions.22 Examples include the handling of the 
                                                        
14 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. Pp33-35, p75 and p78 
15 Friedman. 2012. Ibid. P14; and RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P 33 
16 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P8; and NDP. 2012. Ibid. P428. 
17 Pierre de Vos, Quoted in Ben-Zeev K. 2014. Report on People’s Power, People’s Parliament: A civil society conference 
on South Africa’s Legislatures. 13 – 15 August 2012. P11  
18 Ben-Zeev, K. 2014. Report on People’s Power, People’s Parliament: A civil society conference on South Africa’s 
Legislatures. 13 – 15 August 2012. Pp 6-11 
19 Observed by the author, for a number of hours after a Treatment Action Campaign march regarding patent laws on 
medicines, this protestor stood at the staff entrance to parliament with a placard repeating this phrase.  
20 Vuyiseka Dubula, Quoted in Ben-Zeev, K. 2014. Report on People’s Power, People’s Parliament: A civil society 
conference on South Africa’s Legislatures. 13 – 15 August 2012. P7 
21 Quoted in RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. p40 
22 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. 
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investigation into corruption in the arms deal; the ‘travelgate scandal’23; decisions relating to 
incumbent National Prosecuting Authority bosses over time; the closure of the Scorpions unit; 
and the processing of the Protection of State Information Bill, amongst others.24  She 
demonstrates how the quality of ruling party MPs regarding their allegiance to constitutional 
values has weakened over time from the first heady years post 1994 and how this is linked to the 
increasing strength of the executive in the Parliament.25 However, she argues that executive 
interference does not always result in negative outcomes when assessed against the issue of 
constitutionality of decisions, she refers to interventions by senior party leaders in the executive 
to address MPs resistance to the passage of the Civil Unions Bill26 in order to remind them of their 
duty to uphold the Constitution irrespective of their personal feelings regarding the issue.27  
 
This bloating of executive power at the expense of the influence of legislatures and consequently 
at the expense of state responsiveness to citizen input, lies at the heart of calls for Parliament to 
review the electoral system and consider incorporating more direct constituency-based selection 
of representatives in the national system, while maintaining some aspects of the party list 
system.28  
 
There is some tension regarding the interpretation of the way in which elected representatives 
should engage with citizens, does public participation end with the direction given by citizens 
through voting in elections, or do representatives have a duty to engage with the views of citizens 
on a regular basis? Government claims’ that because it was elected, it represents society and 
therefore need not consider civil society’s29 ongoing inputs, is problematic since elections do not 
translate into politicians knowing what citizens’ views are on different policy issues.30 In response 
to the tensions that arise from incorporating participatory democracy into representative systems 
the Constitutional Court has plainly ruled that South Africa’s constitutional democracy requires 
the incorporation of ongoing political participation of citizens.31 
 
                                                        
23 A scandal in which 40 MPs were accused of fraudulent use of parliamentary travel vouchers 
24 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. Pages: 32; 43; 96 and 99 
25 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P43 
26 Now the Civil Union Act No. 17 of 2006 
27 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. Pp41 and 42 
28 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. Pp41 and 42; and Report of the Electoral Task Team. 2003. Pp17-18 
29 The term civil society encompasses a broad range of non-state actors including the private sector, organized labour, 
religious sectors, academic institutions, non-governmental organisations, social movements, and community-based 
organisations and structures. In this paper I will use it specifically to refer to organized groups including most of these, 
however I will refer specifically to organized labour and the private sector at times in the discussion. I use the term ‘the 
public’ or ‘citizens’ interchangeably to refer to those members of the public who are not members of any organizing 
structure, however I do not intend, when using the word ‘citizens’ to exclude those members of the South African 
public who are not citizens of South Africa. 
30 Friedman S and McKeiser E. 2009. Civil society and the post-Polokwane South African State: assessing civil society’s 
prospects of improved policy engagement. Centre for the Study of Democracy; Rhodes University/University of 
Johannesburg: Commissioned by the Heinrich Boell Foundation. P40 
31 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others  CCT 12/05 2006. (DfL) Para 116 
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Ensuring public participation in the legislatures not only promotes a people-centred democracy, it 
is also important because it can strengthen the functioning of the legislatures. Effective public 
participation can improve the capacity of legislatures to hold the executive to account. 
Information from civil society and the public more broadly, serves to verify the information that is 
provided by the executive which is vital for effective oversight.32 Further, many civil society 
organisations (CSOs) have technical expertise and experience on specific issues which elected 
representatives do not. Finally, due to the statutory provisions regarding their openness, engaging 
with the legislatures affords the public access to information that may be difficult to obtain 
through government departments, this enhances efforts to monitor government performance 
and engage with government priorities and spending. The provincial legislatures (PLs) play an 
important role due to their mandate for oversight over the performance of provincial 
departments. It is at this level that many of the decisions relating to delivery on socio-economic 
rights such as health, education, housing and social services are taken.  
 
Participation is political 
 
Public participation is not simply a technical exercise, it’s highly politicised. Who speaks and who 
has influence on outcomes is strongly linked to systems of political and social power.33 This plays 
out, not only in the extent to which the state engages in public participation, but also the extent 
to which participation impacts on decisions. A framework for participation, which must address 
technical avenues for access and participation, must also be alive to its inherent politics.34 
Without this, the vision for widespread meaningful public engagement will not be realised.  
 
Public participation at its best is considered within a rights-based perspective.35 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ (UNSREPHR’s) recent report on participation 
of people living in poverty strongly argues this point, stating that participation is a “precondition 
or catalyst for the realisation and enjoyment of other human rights and of fundamental 
importance in empowering people living in poverty to tackle inequalities and asymmetries of 
power in society.” 36 The report firmly establishes participation as a fundamental human right and 
recognises it as being central to promoting social justice.37 The Constitutional Court in Doctors for 
Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (2006) also refers to the value of 
                                                        
32 Ajam T at the People’s Power People’s Parliament Civil Society Conference on South Africa’s Legislatures 2012. 
Quoted in Ben-Zeev 2014. Ibid. P48 
33 Mander H. 2005. ‘Rights as struggle – towards a more just and humane world’. In Gready P & Ensor J (Eds) 
Reinventing Development?: Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice. Pp240-241 
34 Hickey, S and Mohan, G. 2005. Relocating participation within a radical politics of development. Development and 
Change, 36(2), pp. 237–262. Accessed at http://oro.open.ac.uk/4103/1/Hickey_and_Mohan_revised_70704.pdf on 17 
August 2014. P19 (page number refers to the open source version) 
35 Gaventa, J. 2009. ‘Exploring Citizenship, participation and accountability’ IDS bulletin vol 33, issue 2. P2 
36 UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona. Recommendations to 
States: an operational framework to ensure meaningful participation of people living in poverty. Human Rights Council 
A/HR/C/23/36 11 March 2013. (UNSREPHR) 
37 Lister 1998 p228 in Gaventa 2009. Ibid. p5. 
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participation to achieve redistribution, indicating that “Participatory democracy is of special 
importance to those who are relatively disempowered in a country like ours where great 
disparities of wealth and influence exist.”38  
 
Strong legislatures, capacitated to fulfil their representative, oversight and legislative functions 
are critical to ensure a democratic system capable of achieving social justice and promoting 
human rights. To play this role, legislatures must be empowered through legislation, be 
independent, open and accessible to citizens and be sufficiently resourced. Equally, strong 
democracies require strong, diverse and independent civil society that promotes a plurality of 
voices.39 
 
In the following chapters, I start in Chapter two with a discussion of the normative legal 
framework for political participation. I discuss the IHRL framework for political participation, 
describing developments in this and focussing on the recent report of the UNSREPHRs 
recommendations to states in this regard. I follow this with a description of the South African 
legal and policy framework for participation, considering the constitutional provisions for public 
involvement in the legislatures, along with reflecting on the Constitutional Court’s elaboration on 
these and the role of participation in South Africa’s representative democracy. In addition to a 
brief look at legislation relating to citizen participation, I explore the Rules of the legislatures in 
some detail before finally considering relevant frameworks recently developed by the legislatures.  
 
Chapter three is dedicated to exploring the theoretical frameworks related to public participation.  
I discuss the developing theoretical understanding of and the empirical evidence supporting the 
incorporation of deliberative approaches and rights-based participation in representative 
systems. I then turn to the question of the spaces in which participation takes place, those who 
‘own’ those spaces, define the terms of engagement and this impacts on their relative potential 
for political influence. 40 Understanding how power shapes and plays out in public participation is 
also critical to understand the potential for and limits of influence of participation, this question 
applies as much to power within civil society as to power between the state and the public and 
offers an explanation of why strong normative frameworks generally fail to deliver on their 
promises of citizen influence.  
 
In chapter four, I turn to the question of the range of mechanisms provided by South Africa’s 
legislatures for participation and their performance regarding both their legislative and oversight 
functions. I draw on a range of examples and studies to examine in some detail if the public have 
                                                        
38 DfL. Ibid. Para 115 
39 Friedman and McKeiser. 2009. ibid. Pp12-14 
40 Gaventa J. 2006. Finding the spaces for change: a power analysis. IDS Bulletin Volume 37 Number 6 November 2006 
© Institute of Development Studies P112 
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influenced the outcomes of various processes and what the political and systemic factors were 
that prevented or facilitated influence. In this discussion I also engage with questions of the 
performance of civil society in making claims on the legislatures and in creating other 
opportunities to enhance political influence. I then consider examples of how elected 
representatives have used their power to define the spaces and terms of engagement to serve 
broader political agendas. 
 
I conclude with an assessment of the performance of South Africa’s legislatures against the 
standards set out in the IHRL framework and those defined through theory, before addressing 
myself to the question of whether there is any point to the public and civil society continuing to 









Over the past 50 years, international standards for citizen participation have improved, and it has 
been articulated as a fundamental human right.41 In addition, requirements for greater direct 
citizen participation within representative democracies have gained more traction.42 The South 
African Constitution is explicit in its requirements for participation in legislative processes and 
these requirements have been interrogated by our courts, which have also ruled that South 
Africa’s representative democracy must incorporate systems of direct participation as well as 
providing further direction regarding how participation should be implemented.43 There is no 
single piece of legislation or policy in South Africa to govern public participation. In terms of the 
legislatures guidance is mostly contained in the Rules of the legislatures, along with a number of 
other documents with variable levels of enforceability, standards and frameworks for 
participation. 
 
In this chapter I look at the evolving provisions in the international human rights law framwork for 
citizen participation, and how these are linked to the right to information. I provide a summary of 
the recent reccomendations to states of the UN Special Rapporteur on Poverty and Human Rights 
regarding participation. I then turn to the South African framework, starting with the provisions of 
the Constitution, their limits, and the decisions of the Courts in respect of the role of direct 
participation within our representative democracy. I briefly look at legislation that deals with 
oversight and public participation before taking a more comprehensive look at the Rules of the 
legislatures which relate to openness, access and public participation. Finally, I discuss the Public 
Participation Framework and Oversight Model for the South African Legislative Sector. Both 
provide further direction to support the aspiration for effective public participation in the work of 
the legislatures. 
 
2. International Human Rights Law Framework 
 
The international human rights law (IHRL) framework addresses the issue of citizens’ political 
participation extensively. A range of international treaties and conventions express the right to 
                                                        
41 UNSREPHR. Ibid. Para 20 
42 UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. 1979. Article 7(b); UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106. 
Article 3(c); and The Declaration on the Right to Development. A/RES/41/128. 4 December 1986. Article 8(2) in 
reference to Article 8(1) 
43 DfL. Ibid. 
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participate and emphasise participation’s role in promoting access to all human rights and 
freedoms.  
 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that ‘everyone has the right to take part in the 
government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’.44 Similarly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that ‘every citizen has the right 
and opportunity … to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives’.45 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) also 
expresses the right, stating that “every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the 
government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance 
with the provisions of the law”.46 These provisions foreground indirect participation in 
representative forms of democracy, but also make clear the right to direct participation in public 
affairs. They afford states wide discretion to define in legislation and constitutions, the forms and 
means of participation in public affairs that they adopt.47  
 
Since the late 1970s, the extent to which participation in political and public life is addressed by 
the IHRL framework has deepened by elaborating on the nature of issues to which the right to 
participate in public life applies. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 
particular, provide stronger indications of the importance of direct participation of citizens and 
people in decisions on issues that affect their lives. They articulate strong requirements for on-
going political participation in the implementation of policy of the groups addressed in those 
treaties.48 
 
 The CEDAW, while asserting women’s right to participate on an equal basis with men, elaborates 
that participation goes beyond voting for representation, to participation in the development of 
policy and, importantly, participation in the implementation of that policy.49 The Declaration on 
the Right to Development sets participation as the basis for development, stating in its first article 
that ‘every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental 
                                                        
44 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 10 December 1948 General Assembly Resolution 207A (III). Article 21(1). 
Article 21(3) goes further to state: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” 
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1966. (ICCPR) Article 25 
46 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982). Article 13(1) 
47 General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public 
service (Art. 25): 12/07/96. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, General Comment No. 25. Para 5 
48 UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. 1979. Article 7(b). It states that 
‘women, on equal terms with men’ have the right ‘to participation in the formulation of government policy and the 
implementation thereof …’ (CEDAW) 
49 CEDAW. Ibid. Article 29(b) 
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freedoms can be fully realised’.50 The Declaration further recognises that the right to development 
includes the ‘full realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination’.51 Finally, the Declaration 
requires states, at national level, to ‘encourage popular participation in all spheres’ to enable 
development and fully realise human rights.52 The CRPD stresses the participation of persons with 
disabilities in a range of articles, requiring under its general principles the ‘full and effective 
participation and inclusion in society’ of persons with disabilities.53 It augments this commitment 
by placing an obligation on states to ‘closely consult with and actively involve persons with 
disabilities’ in the development and implementation of legislation and policy.54 Article 29 of the 
CRPD is dedicated to the requirement for the participation of persons with disabilities in political 
and public life.55 It is arguable that the same standards for participation in the development and 
implementation of law and policy provided in CEDAW and the CRPD must apply to all citizens.  
 
In 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (UNSREPHR), 
Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona, issued a report which provides recommendations to states to 
ensure meaningful participation of people living in poverty.56 Her report stipulates that 
participation is considered a fundamental human right. “This report focuses on the intrinsic value 
of participation as a fundamental right to which individuals are inherently entitled by virtue of 
their humanity”.57 The report starts with an analysis of the ways in which manifestations of power 
and poverty intersect with the right to participate. She then describes a human rights based 
approach to participation, stressing that meaningful participation requires respect for people’s 
rights to dignity, autonomy and agency; non-discrimination and equality; transparancy and access 
to information; accountability; and empowerment.58  While the recommendations provide 
minimum standards, the UNSREPHR indicates that universal guidelines for participation are not 
desireable as different socio-cultural contexts and power dynamics require different approaches. 
Instead, she stresses that the forms that participation take must be developed in consultation 
with communities.59  
 
Carmona’s recommendations to states include that states adopt legal frameworks which explicitly 
include the right to participate.60 These frameworks must include participatory mechanisms at 
local and national levels; policies and operational guidelines; an explicit duty on public officials 
                                                        
50 The Declaration on the Right to Development. A/RES/41/128. 4 December 1986. (DRD) Article 1(1) 
51 DRD. Ibid. Article 1(2) 
52 DRD. Ibid. Article 8(2) in reference to Article 8(1) which elaborates on the rights to equal opportunity to access basic 
resources, education, health, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income. 
53 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution/adopted by the General 
Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106. (CRPD) Article 3(c)  
54 CRPD. Ibid. Article 4(3) 
55 CRPD. Ibid. Article 29. This article deals with the right to participate in elections in representative democracy and in 
the conduct of public affairs. 
56 UNSREPHR. Ibid.  
57 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 20 
58 UNSREPHR. ibid. Paras 35 - 79 
59 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 81 
60 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(a) 
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and policy makers to ensure the participation of people living in poverty; and developing and 
enforcing minimum standards for the participation of people living in poverty and other 
disadvantaged groups.61 She also makes recommendations regarding legislative measures that 
must be in place in order to ensure a national environment conducive to meaningful participation. 
These include decentralisation of decision making structures; legislation prohibiting 
discrimination; and laws that support freedom of association, media freedom, and access to 
information and whistle-blower protection.62 The report specifies that public participation in 
budget formulation and monitoring should be included in national frameworks.63 These 
recommendations go further than establishing a legislative and policy framework to require states 
to allocate sufficient resources;64 take measures to address inequality and discrimination;65 
ensure access to information;66 put in place accountability mechanisms such as complaints system 
and reporting requirments;67 ensure empowerment of the people who participate;68 and support 
civil society.69 Finally in recognition of the important role played by national human rights 
institutions, Carmona includes recommendations requiring these to promote and monitor the 
implementation of the right to participate.70 
 
The fact that the report centrally engages with and attempts to address the ways in which power 
and poverty negatively affect participation, means that it goes beyond the typical technical 
framing of the right to participate as is the case with most IHR instruments. 
 
Participation is intrinsically linked to access to information. The ICCPR provides the right to seek, 
receive and impart information.71 In the same vein, but more clearly stated, the Banjul Charter 
provides that ‘every individual shall have the right to receive information’.72 Although the IHRL 
provisions, including the UDHR and the ICCPR, are not particularly strong and do not provide 
much detail, Mendel argues that the right to information as a fundamental right is ‘beyond 
question’.73 He refers to Resolution 59(I) of the UN General Assembly, made as early as 1946, 
which states that “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of 
all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated”.74 Mendel argues further that 
although at the time of writing the treaties mentioned above, the right was not understood to 
                                                        
61 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(a)(i) 
62 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(a)(ii), (iii), and (vii) 
63 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(a)(iv) 
64 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(b) 
65 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(c) 
66 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(d) 
67 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(e) 
68 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(f) 
69 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(g) 
70 UNSREPHR. ibid. Para 86(h) 
71 ICCPR. Ibid. Article 19(2) 
72 Banjul Charter. Ibid. Article 9(1) 
73 Mendel T. undated. Freedom of information as an internationally protected right. ARTICLE 19. Accessed at 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/foi-as-an-international-right.pdf on 15 01 2015 
74 UN Resolution 59(I) Calling of an international conference on freedom of information accessed at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/NR003310.pdf?OpenElement on 15 01 2015 
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include information held by public bodies, this understanding has shifted and ‘the content of 
rights are not static’.75  
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinon 
and Expression is emphatic that access to information is a right.76 In his report to the UN 
Economic and Social Council in 2000 he stated: “The right to seek, receive and impart information 
is not merely a corollary of freedom of opinion and expression; it is a right in and of itself”.77 
Importantly, he asserts that the right to participate is dependent on access to information, 
arguing that information: “is one of the rights upon which free and democratic societies depend. It 
is also a right that gives meaning to the right to participate”.78  
 
The IHRL framework thus requires a significant level of citizen participation, and particularly 
participation of marginalised groups, for the realisation of political rights and development more 
broadly.79 It encompasses indirect participation through the right to vote and the right to citizens’ 
direct participation on an ongoing basis in public affairs. In addition it establishes the right to 
information as fundamental to participation rights. 
 
3. Constitutional mandate 
 
The Constitution articulates the vision of South Africa as a democracy driven by its people, stating 
in the preamble that the purpose of the Constitution is to “Lay the foundations for a democratic 
and open society in which government is based on the will of the people …”.80 Further, the 
Constitution entrenches Parliament as the centre of South Africa’s democracy, requiring that the 
National Assembly (NA) “represent the people” and “ensure government by the people under the 
Constitution”.81  
 
The broad powers of national and provincial legislatures include their mandates to pass and 
amend legislation;82 to ensure that the executive are accountable to it;83 and to exercise oversight 
over the executive’s implementation of legislation.84 The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) has 
a slighly different role to the NA and PLs; it is envisaged as a council to represent the interests of 
                                                        
75 Mendel T. 2008. Ibid.. P8 
76 UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Abid 
Hussain. Report to the UN Ecomonic and Social Council.  E/CN.4/2000/63 18 January 2000. 
77 UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Ibid. Para 
42 
78 UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Ibid. Para 
42 
79 United Nations Population Fund. http://www.unfpa.org/rights/principles.htm accessed 06 March 2013 
80 Act 108 of 1996. Preamble  
81 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Section 42(3) 
82 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Section 55(1) for the NA and Section 114(1) for PLs 
83 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Section 55(2)(a) for the NA and Section 114(2)(a) for PLs 
84 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Section 55(2)(b) for the NA and Section 114(2)(b) for PLs 
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the provinces and not ‘the people’ specifically.85 In addition to these broad functions of the 
legislatures, the Constitution contains specific provisions which expand on its public participation 
and representivity functions, requiring a high level of openness, public access and public 
involvement in the legislatures. Three sections are dedicated to these issue, section 59 in relation 
to the NA, section 72 in relation to the NCOP and section 118 dealing with the PLs. The text of 
these sections is largely similar, conveying the same principles.  
 
Firstly, they require the legislatures to ‘facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other 
processes’ of the institutions and the various committees that function within these.86 Secondly, 
the provisions require the legislatures to conduct their business in an open manner and that 
sittings must be held in public.87 This second requirement is limited in that public access and 
access of the media can be regulated and that people can be refused entry or removed.88 The 
potential for exclusion is qualified in that exclusion may only take place if “it is reasonable and 
justifiable to do so in an open and democratic society’.89 Two issues must be noted regarding 
these provisions. Firstly, the Constitution does not refer specifically to participation but rather 
‘involvement’, and its exact meaning is not defined. The Constitution then indicates that the 
legislatures could elaborate on how public involvement is achieved through the development of 
rules and orders for the institution.90 Secondly this involvement in the processes of legislatures 
applies not only to law reform, but also to the ‘other processes’ they are mandated to fulfil; thus 
public involvement is required in the execution of their accountability and oversight functions as 
well.  
 
South African courts have dealt with the question of the role of the legislatures to promote 
participatory democracy and provided further guidance on public participation in legislative 
processes.91 In 2006, in Doctors for Life International vs The Speaker of the National Assembly 
(DfL)92, the Constitutional Court dealt specifically with the legislative mandate of the legislatures. 
The Court first explores the meanings of the words ‘involvement’ and ‘participation’ and 
concludes that, plainly put, “Facilitation of public involvement in the legislative process, therefore, 
means taking steps to ensure that the public participate in the legislative process”.93 The Court 
then stresses that the form that the participation takes is at the discretion of the legislatures and 
will vary in different cases.94  
                                                        
85 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Section 42(4) 
86 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Sections 59(1)(a); 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a). 
87 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Sections 59(1)(b); 72(1)(b) and 118(1)(b). 
88 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Sections 59(1)(b)(i) and (ii); 72(1)(b)(i) and(ii) and 118(1)(b)(i) and (ii) 
89 Act 108 of 1996. ibid Section s 59(2); 72(2) and 118(2) 
90 Act 108 of 1996. Ibid. Section 57(1)(b) 
91 King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Minister of Justice SCA 561/04; DfL. Ibid; Matatiele 
Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2006 (5) BCLR 622 (CC) 
92 DfL. Ibid.  
93 DfL. Ibid. Para 120 
94 DfL. Ibid. Paras 124 and 125 
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The Constitutional Court sets out a reasonableness test to establish the appropriate extent and 
nature of public participation.95 This test requires the consideration of a number of factors, 
primary among these are ‘the nature and importance of the legislation’ linked to the ‘intensity of 
its impact on the public’.96 The Court also indicates that the practicalities and efficiency of the law-
making process should be considered, at the same time cautioning that inadequate public 
involvement cannot be justified based on these practical considerations alone.97 The Court clearly 
expresses that in considering reasonableness, it will take Parliament’s own veiws on what is 
appropriate into account.98 In addition, it defines that the constitutional obligation includes 
providing meaningful opportunities for public participation in the law making processes and 
taking measures to ensure that people have the ability to take advantage of the opportunities 
that are provided.99 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledges that public participation extends from making 
information available to the public through to providing platforms for participation in decision 
making.100 Similarly, the Constitutional Court, drawing on US administrative policy, indicates that 
“public involvement may be seen as ‘a continuum that ranges from providing information and 
building awareness, to partnering in decision-making.’”101 The Constitutional Court is clear that 
Parliament must “provide notice of and information about the legislation under consideration” 
and regarding the available opportunities for participation.102 However, it does not provide any 
guidance regarding format or timeframes. It also offers some ideas that can be incorporated into 
the participation strategies of the legislatures, suggesting that public education may be a useful 
approach to provide information and facilitate learning and understanding, which in turn would 
improve the possibility that the public involvement is ‘meaningful’; and considering other 
mechanisms such as ‘road shows, regional workshops, radio programmes and publications’.103 
 
All in all, the courts have firmly upheld that the legislatures have a duty to facilitate public 
involvement in law reform, but have chosen not to provide direction on how this should be 
implemented, leaving this to the discretion of the legislatures. The reasonableness test would 
thus need to be applied in the context of specific pieces of legislation. To date, the courts have 
                                                        
95 DfL. Ibid. Para 127 
96 DfL. Ibid. Para 128 
97 DfL. Ibid. Para 128 
98 DfL. Ibid. Para 128 
99 DfL. Ibid. Para 129 
100 King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another 2006(4) BCLR 462 (SCA) 
101  DfL. Ibid. Para 129. Quoting States National Park Service, Director’s Order No 75A: Civic Engagement and Public 
Involvement, 17 November 2003, available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/75A.htm [accessed 24 July 2006] at 
section V. See also United States Code of Regulations, Title 40 (Protection of Environment), 40 CFR 25(1)(a), (b) and (d), 
National Wildlife Federation v Burford 835 F.2d 305, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  Section V 
102 DfL. Ibid. Para 131 
103 DfL. Ibid. Para 132 
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not provided any further direction regarding public involvement in the ‘other’ functions of the 
legislatures. 
 
There is some tension regarding the interpretation of the way in which representatives, elected 
by the public, should engage with citizens. Does public participation end with the direction given 
by citizens through voting in elections, or do representatives have a duty to engage with the views 
of citizens on a regular basis? The Constitutional Court is emphatic that South Africa’s democracy, 
given the apartheid history, is both representative and participatory.104  
 
“The democratic government that is contemplated in the Constitution is thus a 
representative and participatory democracy which is accountable, responsive and 
transparent…” 
 
It indicates that in the development of the Constitution, value was placed on people’s ongoing 
participation in decisions which affect their lives beyond voting in elections.105 The Court states 
that these should not be seen in tension with each other, as they are mutually supportive 
concepts which have a vital relationship to each other.106  
 
It then elaborates on the value of ongoing direct public participation within a framework of 
representative democracy. 
 
“The participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to the functioning 
of representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the country to be actively involved 
in public affairs, identify themselves with the institutions of government and become 
familiar with the laws as they are made. It enhances the civic dignity of those who 
participate by enabling their voices to be heard and taken account of.  It promotes a spirit 
of democratic and pluralistic accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to 
be widely accepted and effective in practice. … Finally, because of its open and public 





                                                        
104 DfL. Ibid. Para 121 
105 DfL. Ibid. Para 108 
106 DfL. Ibid. Para 122 
107 DfL. Ibid. Para 115 
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The Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act108 provides a 
statutory framework in which legislatures must function. It includes broad provisions dealing with 
issues such as the independence and immunities of members,109 disciplinary action against 
members,110 the management of the precinct of parliament111 and broadcasting of the 
proceedings of parliament.112 It does not provide significant direction in terms of the functioning 
of parliament, nor regarding public access and participation (save for the sections which give the 
Speaker control over broadcasting from Parliament); most of this direction is provided through 
the Rules of the legislatures, which I discuss in more detail below. 
 
The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (Money Bills Act)113 is significant 
because it provides for stronger direction to legislatures in terms of their constitutional role to 
perform oversight over the executive. It focusses on the role of the legislatures in decisions 
regarding the utilisation of public money and seeks to enhance the systems of parliamentary 
oversight over executive decisions relating to financial planning, budgeting and spending.  
Analysis of the Act, however, raises questions about the impact of the legislation. Pauw argues 
that it will not be effective for two primary reasons: the systems and procedures contained in the 
Act are too onerous for legislatures to effectively implement them and, most importantly, the role 
given to Treasury in the Act dominates the Parliamentary process and decisions.114  
 
Section 5 of the Money Bills Act requires parliamentary committees to assess departmental 
performance on an annual basis. It sets out the basis on which this assessment must be made, 
including consideration of the medium term estimates of expenditure, the strategic plans, 
expenditure report, funancial statements and annual reports of each department.115 Committees 
are then required to submit budgetary review and recommendation reports (BRRRs), which must  
assess the performance of departments in delivering services in the context of the resources 
available. It must assess the effectiveness of the use and allocation of resources; and it may 
include recommendations regarding the future allocation of resources.116 The Act does not 
mandate public participation in this part of the process, thus the general provisions of the 
Constitution regarding public participation apply. Section 8, however, mandates the committees 
on Appropriation and Finance to hold annual public hearings regarding the annual fiscal 
framework and revenue proposals.117 This legislated duty to involve the public on a particular 
                                                        
108 Powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004. 
109 Act 4 of 2004. ibid Chapter 3 
110 Act 4 of 2004. ibid Chapter 4 
111 Act 4 of 2004. ibid Chapter 2 
112 Act 4 of 2004. ibid Chapter 6 
113 Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. No. 9 of 2009 
114 Pauw JC. 2011. ‘Will the Money Bills Amendment Act enhance the power of the purse in South Africa?’ Politeia. Vol 
30: Issue 3: 54-73 
115 Act. No. 9 of 2009. Ibid. Section 5(1) 
116 Act. No. 9 of 2009. Ibid. Section 5(2) 
117 Act. No. 9 of 2009. Ibid. Section 8(2) 
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issue signals the intention of the legislature to ensure that public opinion is embedded in 
processes relating to public money.  
 
5. Rules of the National Assembly 
 
The Constitition empowers the NA, NCOP and PLs to make rules regarding their procedures.118 It 
enjoins that these rules should be made with ‘due regard to the representative and participatory 
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement’.119 The NA and NCOP have 
developed rules, so too have the PLs. These are regularly updated; by May 2014, the Rules of the 
NA were in their 8th edition and further amendments had been made to that edition in May of 
that year already.120 The last time that the NCOP rules were updated was in their 9th edition 
published in 2008.121 In this discussion, I focus on the provisions of the most recent Rules for the 
NA dealing with openness, public access, and public involvement.  
 
Chapter four deals with the sittings of the Assembly. Rule 22 states the general rule that the 
proceedings of the Assembly are to be conducted in public. Part 5 of this chapter deals in more 
detail with Public Access to proceedings in the House and certain committees; interestingly the 
public are referred to as ‘strangers’ in this Part. Rule 40 provides that the Speaker may admit 
strangers to the house; rule 41 provides that strangers may be ordered to withdraw and 42 
provides for the removal of strangers under certain circumstances. 
 
Chapter 12 of the Rules provides a large number of rules relating to the committee system. Rule 
152 reiterates the provisions of the Constitution in that the meetings of committees must be open 
to the public and the media.122 It then provides a number of grounds on which exception can be 
made and the public or the media excluded.123 Rule 154 allows for the presiding officer of a 
committee to exclude members of the public and rule 156 provides for the removal of members 
of the public under certain circumstances.  
 
Public participation in the work of committees is covered in rule 138, which covers ‘general 
powers of the committees’. This rule gives committees the powers to summon people to appear 
                                                        
118 Act 108 of 1996. Ibid. Sub sections 57(1)(b) and 57(2) in respect of the NA; sub sections 70(1)(b) and 70(2) in respect 
of the NCOP; and sub sections 116(1)(b) and 116(2) for the PLs. 
119 Act 108 of 1996. Ibid. Sections 57(1)(b), NA; 70(1)(b), NCOP; and 116(1)(b) PLs. 
120 Rules of the National Assembly 8th Edition February 2014 as amended May 2014. Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa (NA Rules) 
121 Rules of the National Council of Provinces 9th Edition: March 2008. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
122 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rule 152(1) 
123 These are when this is allowed by legislation, Rules, or resolutions of the Assembly (sub-rule 152(1)(a)). Or where the 
matter under consideration is of a private nature or prejudicial to a person, is protected under parliamentary privilege, 
is confidential in terms of legislation, or where confidential treatment is reasonable and justifieable in an open and 
democratic society. Sub-rule 152(1)(b). 
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before them to give evidence or produce documents;124 to receive submissions from interested 
persons or institutions;125 to conduct public hearings;126 and to permit oral submissions.127 
Although participation is enabled by rule 138, committees retain the discretion as to if and when 
the public should be involved, and no further direction is given. In contrast, rules inserted in 2011 
dealing with ‘Public Involvement’ in the Standing Committees on Finance and Appropriations are 
stronger, clearly stating that public involvement is imperative.128 These rules require, in relation to 
each of those two committees, that: ‘The committee must ensure public involvement in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and 
Related Matters Act, 2009.’ Giving effect to sections in that Act which require Parliament’s rules 
to include public hearings on the development of annual fiscal framework and revenue 
proposals.129  
 
Participation in relation to law reform processes is dealt with under chapter 13 of the rules, which 
deals with the legslative process. These include rules requiring notice of the introduction of draft 
legislation and summaries thereof to be published in the Government Gazette.130 Only a small 
proportion of the public monitor the Gazette, but no other measures are specified to ensure that 
sectors of the public that may be affected by a particular bill are notified regarding its 
introduction. Where the full bill is published, it must be accompanied by an invitation to the 
public for written submissions and the timeframes for these submissions specified (although the 
actual timeframes are not specified in the rule).131 Finally, if a bill has been published for public 
comment, the Rules require that the relevant committee must ‘arrange its business in such a 
manner that interested persons and institutions have an opportunity to comment on the bill’.132 
 
The rules fail to provide significant direction, guidance or standards for how participation should 
be implemented. In addition, except for the 2011 rules which deal with public participation in the 
fiscal framework and revenue proposals process, they do not expressly address the current blind-
spot that exists regarding the issue of public participation in the ‘other’ functions of Parliament.  
 
6. Other Initiatives to enhance public participation in the legislatures 
 
                                                        
124 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rule 138(a) 
125 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rule 138(b) 
126 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rule 138 (c) 
127 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rule 138(d) 
128 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rules 203F and 203M 
129 Act. No. 9 of 2009. Ibid. Sub-section 8(2) “the committees must conduct joint public hearings on the fiscal framework 
and revenue proposals” and sub-section 9(5) “The standing rules must provide for … (b) public hearings by committees 
on appropriations”. 
130 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Sub-rule 241(1)(b) and (c) 
131 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Sub-rule 241(2) 
132 NA Rules. 2014. Ibid. Rule 249(1) 
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Parliament has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve public engagement in its processes. 
Systems for participation in legislative reform are well developed, including, over the last five 
years, systems to ensure participation of rural communities on legislative reform. A Public 
Participation Framework (PPF) for the legislatures was finalised in 2013,133  the Oversight and 
Accountability Model in 2009134 and an Oversight Model for the South African Legislative Sector 
(SOM) in 2012.135 Other initiatives include sectoral parliaments which take place at national or 
provincial level in which specific sectors are engaged136 and the ‘Taking Legislatures to the People’ 
initiative in which legislatures go out to communities to host meetings.137   
 
Public Participation Framework 
To give more direction to the legislatures regarding the standards and nature of public 
participation, the legislative sector138 developed the PPF to guide the public involvement in the 
legislatures. It articulates its goal as ‘seeking ways of achieving Public Participation’ in order to 
deepen democracy’.139 It sets its objectives to obtain the public’s views on policy, legislation and 
other processes; to share knowledge with communities regarding governance issues in order to 
improve the ‘pace and relevance of service delivery’; and to obtain information from people 
regarding their experiences of service delivery in order that government institutions may take 
action to bring about change.140 
 
The core values and principles of the PPF are encouraging, they articulate the expected values 
that the people affected by an issue are involved in the decision making process and that people 
receive the information necessary for participation.141 They go further to articulate some of the 
important values and principles which are central to ‘meaningful particiption’, a concept that will 
be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. In particular, the core values which 
emphasise people’s input in the design of participation opportunities; and communication to 
people on how their input affected decisions, which includes the various perspectives that were 
raised on an issue. Most encouraging is the value that participation processes hold “the promise 
that public’s contribution will influence decision making”.142 Overall the PPF requires planning, co-
ordination, quarterly reporting, feedback to stakeholders and human and financial resources to 
                                                        
133 Public Participation Framework for the South African Legislative Sector. 2013. (PPF) 
134 Parliament of South Africa Oversight and Accountability Model: asserting parliament’s oversight role in enhancing 
democracy. 2009. 
135 Oversight model of the South African Legislative Sector. 2012. Legislative Sector of South Africa (SOM) 
136 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P54 
137 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P48 
138 The South African Legislative Sector is a forum of stakeholders from Parliament and Provincial Legislatures. The SALS 
seeks to strengthen the capacity of legislatures to implement their constitutional mandate. 
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139 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P30 
140 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P30 
141 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P31  
142 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P31 
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enable effective public participation.143 It covers a range of mechanisms for public participation 
including Taking Parliament to the People; Taking Legislatures to the People; public hearings; 
petitions; Sectoral Parliaments; general participation in committees; and participation in oversight 
and law making.144 
 
Notably, the PPF requires that in most cases people have input into the agenda of the 
participation process, that committees produce reports on the processes within three weeks and 
provide feedback to stakeholders on the processes.145 For the first time, we see a timeframe 
specified for notification of the public: in the section dealing with public hearings the PPF requires 
a five week notice period.146 It also considers to whom notice should be given, indicating in 
relation to participation on oversight that committees should maintain lists of stakeholders and 
that these lists should include experts and academics as well as community based structures.147 
Finally, throughout the PPF some direction is provided as to the means of notification, whereby it 
recommends the use of social media for notification.148  
 
As with most well articulated state documents, the PPF is not binding, it states that it provides a 
guideline while also claiming to set minimum requirements.149 The extent to which those 
minimum requirements can be met by the legislatures and their committees, particularly 
considering the fast pace at which some processes are undertaken, is questionable.  
 
Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector 
The SOM was developed subsequent to the Oversight and Accountability Model of 2009 and is 
effectively a more detailed version of that document and applies not only to Parliament but all of 
the legislatures. It also provides a more detailed version of what is required in the Money Bills Act, 
in that it attempts to clarify what is meant by oversight and accountability and aims through this 
to provide information to assist committees in their analysis and debates related to oversight.150  
 
It sets out detailed guidelines for committees regarding the processes relating to their 
engagement with Appropriation Bills and Departmental Votes, quarterly and annual reports, 
strategic budget reviews, and oversight visits and intervention studies.151 The SOM strongly 
emphasises public participation at each stage of the process requiring ‘constant enlistment of 
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external information input for independent verification’.152 Overall the SOM is extremely detailed. 
The requirements for public participation in the oversight over quarterly and annual reports, 





Citizen participation is well established as a human right. Over time, the articulation this right has 
expanded beyond voting to include participation in processes relating to the development and 
implementation of law and policy. The Constitution places legislatures at the heart of our 
democracy, in terms of their duty to represent citizens, consult with the public in the 
development of law and in fulfilling their oversight and accountability functions. Importantly the 
South African constitutional promise of citizen participation extends beyond indirect participation 
through elections to direct citizen participation on an on-going basis.  
 
In spite of the Constitutional Court’s interrogation of the legislatures’ duty to facilitate public 
participation in law making processes, these judgements fail to provide direction to the 
legislatures on how this should be achieved, recognising that different issues require different 
processes. However, the courts do emphasise the importance of the public’s access to 
information to enable effective participation.  
 
The Rules of the legislatures, which should provide some standards for participation, do not go 
substantially further than reiterating in greater detail the Constitutional provisions for openness, 
access and participation. Whereas they appear to mandate participation in law reform processes, 
they are weak on providing similarly for participation in the oversight functions of the legislatures. 
It is only in giving effect to the provisions of the Money Bills Act that there is oversight. However 
the capacity to engage with matters relating to the fiscal framework and national revenue will in 
all probability only lie with a minute proportion of the public. Since the Money Bills Act failed to 
mandate public participation in the annual departmental oversight cycles, the rules do not require 
this either, indicating a lack of initiative on the part of the legislatures to embed participation in 
these processes which are so critical to service delivery.  
 
It is some consolation that the recently developed SOM and PPF do articulate the full scope of 
public participation required in the work of the legislatures, and that the PPF begins to provide 
some minimum standards for how this should be done. However, as admirable as the provisions 
of these documents are, they are not enforceable and their full implementation seems unrealistic 
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in light of their extensive requirements for participation. The SOM in particular is extremely 
ambitious in its requirements.  
 
The domestic framework would be improved by an articulation within the rules of legislatures of 
the minimum requirements for public participation. These should include notification periods and 
the means of notification to ensure that people most affected are notified. It should also include 
standards for pre and post participation processes to ensure that the public are educated on the 
issue in question and receive feedback regarding the process outcomes, including the reasons for 
decisions being taken. Ideally, the framework should go beyond technical detail to allow for 
processes that address the issues discussed by the UNSREPHR regarding the interaction of power 










The term ‘participation’ is often incorrectly used to describe concepts such as information sharing, 
consultation, involvement and engagement.153 The constitutional framework and the direction 
provided to the legislatures by the courts and Parliament’s rules do not address this issue 
adequately. Most public participation exercises of the legislatures and government generally fail 
to meet internationally recognised good practice standards of participation.154 These different 
concepts must be distinguished from each other and guidance must be given to officials on when 
different processes are appropriate. Without greater clarity on what is meant by ‘participation’ 
and what the standards are, many initiatives amount to little more than information sharing 
exercises.155 This creates the impression that they are rubber stamping exercises used to 
legitimise pre-determined agendas.156   
 
Studies into the motivation of government efforts for public participation and deliberation 
indicate that the primary motivation for the development of mechanisms and structures to 
engage with the public is the presence of a policy context that requires this.157 These frameworks 
are underpinned by goals to promote greater connections between government and the people; 
active citizens and stronger communities; and to improve the performance of the public sector.158  
 
In this chapter I consider what the concept of ‘meaningful participation’ entails, and how this 
intersects with the rights-based approaches to public participation that have developed over the 
past 50 years. Theories of deliberative democracy add to our understanding of the most effective 
methods of incorporating ongoing deliberation with the public into representative democratic 
systems. I discuss these theoretical developments and some of the proven benefits of effective 
deliberative process before turning to a discussion on the range of spaces for citizen-state 
engagement, their various limitations and the necessity for civil society to utilise this range of 
spaces to increase political influence.  
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A discussion on political participation is impossible without building an understanding of social 
and political power and how these affect processes, and the potential for public influence. This 
power affects not only state-citizen interactions, but also interactions between citizens and citizen 
groups. It plays out in participation and deliberative processes from the time of defining the issues 
for debate, also affecting who is invited to participate and who has access to the process. 
Importantly, it affects the ways in which the processes are implemented, influencing the rules of 
engagement and the norms of who may speak and whose opinions matter. Manifestations of 
power are closely linked to social exclusion and inequality, in that exclusions broadly present in 
society may be reproduced in or mitigated by participation processes. Exclusion and inequality are 
also linked to problematic claims of representivity and legitimacy, both in terms of co-optation by 
government and elite capture within civil society. I then consider why strong normative 
frameworks do not automatically translate into effective, meaningful participation or deliberation 
within embedded representative democratic systems. Finally, I briefly identify some of the 
negative consequences that are linked to poorly implemented participation exercises.  
 
2. Meaningful participation and rights-based citizen participation 
 
The phrase ‘meaningful participation’ is frequently used to describe an ideal form of 
participation.159 The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) describes these as 
processes that are viewed as a right of those participating, and importantly, which hold the 
promise of influencing decisions.160 Various sources describe the standards required in order for a 
public participation process to be considered ‘meaningful’.161 These are framed by the principle 
that participation must be implemented as processes and not as once-off events. Participants 
should be engaged prior to the actual participation, in order to influence the agenda for the 
process and, importantly, to contribute to defining the terms of the debate and the form that the 
process will take.162 As reflected in the previous chapter, participation processes must ensure that 
those people most affected by the issues are involved; they should enable engagement with the 
views of all participants; ensure that participants are provided with all necessary information prior 
to the process; and incorporate feedback processes to describe the ways in which inputs have 
affected decisions that were taken.163 Finally, participation processes must incorporate 
mechanisms for complaints to facilitate accountability for poorly implemented processes.164 
Public participation is best considered within a rights-based perspective. Mander reflects that, in 
spite of incorporating common themes, rights-based participation approaches are diverse, that 
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these evolve, and that they are frequently contested; as such, she argues that there is no ‘settled 
theory of uniform practice’ for a rights-based approach to participation.165  
 
Building citizen participation is strongly linked to empowerment, however, participation 
approaches have been widely criticised for utilising the language of ‘empowerment’ but failing to 
actually engage with inherent politics or the manifestations of power.166 They are more frequently 
framed and implemented as engagements with local government and less so regarding macro 
political questions or policy formulation.167 This focus on issues of local delivery, but not the broad 
structural systems of exclusion, the weak analysis of the operation of power, and when scaled up, 
the implementation of processes that are technical and not political in their approach contribute 
to their ineffectiveness as empowerment processes.168 
 
Participation practice and theory have evolved significantly since the 1960s within the 
development context. Since the 1990s the theoretical framing has shifted from participation being 
considered a development tool to an understanding that it is an essential aspect of citizenship 
rights.169 Thus there has been a shift towards developing theory of citizen participation that 
addresses the transformation of power relations and the empowerment of people who 
participate, this calls for participation to be undertaken as a political methodology of 
empowerment and not as a technical exercise.170  
 
Political participation underpins the realisation of a range of other rights. The UNSREPHR states 
that participation is a “precondition or catalyst for the realisation and enjoyment of other human 
rights and of fundamental importance in empowering people living in poverty to tackle 
inequalities and asymmetries of power in society.” 171 South African political analysts have similarly 
argued that the most important rights to defend and claim are those relating to people’s full 
participation in national debates, more so than those that address specific issues or protect 
specific groups.172 This recognises that participation as central to promoting social justice. The 
Constitutional Court supports this, indicating that: “Participatory democracy is of special 
importance to those who are relatively disempowered in a country like ours where great 
disparities of wealth and influence exist.”173 
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Mander explains that without engaging in questions of how inequality and social exclusion are 
constructed through the agency and exercise of power by state or private actors, and without 
considering the political process in which people can lay claim to these rights, participation simply 
attaches a new label to development.174 She explains that while this adds to the normative 
framework, it does not engage with how people can change, access and use the framework.175 To 
be effective therefore, rights-based approaches must incorporate certain non-negotiables; they 
must prioritise the people who experience the greatest levels of social exclusion and rights 
violations; and they require at their heart, the potential to build the agency of the people 
affected.176 The people affected must generate the analysis and definition of the issues as well as 
the solutions to these; and as such, processes must be ‘profoundly democratic’.177 Empowerment 
is central, in that people must be enabled to develop their ‘power within’ to build social 
movements, participate in governance and take action to hold the state to account. It is only 
through such processes, Mander argues, that the state will be more likely to act in the interests of 
people affected and the participation can be realised as a right.178  
 
The primary aims of human rights theory and practice are to prevent power abuses; transform 
power relations; challenge oppression, subordination and marginalisation; and promote people’s 
agency.179 As such, participation strategies which co-opt, fail to ensure the possibility of 
influencing outcomes, do not allow for people to define the spaces of participation or reinforce 
discrimination and social inequalities cannot be considered rights-based.180 It is not surprising 
therefore that a human rights approach to participation is more closely aligned with the practice 
of deliberative than representative forms of democracy,181 Chambers explains that deliberative 
democracy provides a ‘rights-friendly theory of robust democracy’.182   
 
3. Theoretical evolution from representative to deliberative democracy 
 
The right of citizens to vote in representative democratic systems is well established, and while it 
is recognised as being critical to democracy, taken on its own, voter-centric democracy provides a 
limited version of democracy with narrow scope for the public to exercise their citizenship 
rights.183 Theorists argue that the quality of democracy is undermined in these systems, 
particularly due to unresponsiveness of governments to citizens and a lack of accountability of the 
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state. They elaborate that representative systems create very weak links between the state and 
citizens.184 The concept of ‘participatory citizenship’ within more direct democratic systems has 
been developed to respond to the weaknesses in the capacity of representative systems to enable 
elected representatives to know what their constituents think about specific issues.185 Thus, in 
participatory systems, further opportunities are afforded to the public for their input into state 
decisions and participation does not end with the vote.186  
 
These have led to the further development of theories of deliberative democracy that are 
concerned with the development of versions of democracy where decisions are taken ‘based on 
public justification through deliberation’.187 These result in the development of mechanisms 
whereby the public engage directly with the state on issues through discussion and deliberation. 
In this way deliberative democratic processes deepen the notion of participatory democracy, as 
people are required in deliberative process not only to make their opinions known on an issue, 
but also to provide rationale for their opinions, enter into exchange on, and develop these 
opinions further.188  
 
Habermas explains that, based on the assumptions that deliberation emphasises relevant issues 
and the arguments surrounding them, it will encourage ‘critical evaluation’ of this discourse, and 
ultimately result in reactions to the topic that are rationally motivated and should result in 
‘reasonable outcomes’.189 Theorists therefore argue that public deliberation enriches 
representative democratic systems as they become less reliant on simple aggregation of opinions 
that are uninformed by a process of discussion, and they help to assess the range of positions 
held by different people in society to develop positions for ‘the common good’.190 In these ways 
the quality and legitimacy of the process and democracy more broadly is improved.191 To have 
this impact, Habermas argues that deliberative democratic processes should be transparent, 
inclusive and allow for equality in the opportunity to participate.192 
 
Empirical studies demonstrate a number of positive impacts of deliberative processes where they 
are conducted under conditions in which participants can engage as ‘reasonable equals’.193 Neblo 
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found that deliberation on issues (such as affirmative action and gay people being employed in 
the military) did not result in greater polarisation as had been suggested by critics, but rather in 
greater agreement within the groups.194 Studies also indicate that the final decisions taken by 
participants differed from their original positions on the issues, and these positions demonstrated 
that participants were more informed, and had a wider range of perspectives on the issue.195 
Overall these processes are linked to improved cooperation and collective problem solving, 
strengthening citizen empowerment and improvements in implementing policy.196 In addition, the 
evidence shows that effective deliberative processes enhance parity in participation spaces.197 
And as a result of negotiation between officials and the public, as well as interactions between 
civil society groupings through the process, the participants expand beyond the original target 
group that was identified.198 
  
However, deliberative democratic processes are generally limited to interactions with smaller 
groups within the broader public and the valuable exchange of ideas and reasoning is not 
available to most people. Thus public opinion more broadly, is often informed or shaped by the 
debates as they take place in the mass media, which has limited potential, in that it is a mediated 
mechanism of communication which is subject to influence by those with the power to engage in 
that space.199  
 
Research suggests that deliberative processes, even when instituted by the state, fulfil a function 
of constructing civil society. Studies also show that deliberative engagements have the potential 
to facilitate the emergence of new activists who continue to engage on a range of social issues 
over time, thus having the unplanned consequence of being ‘schools’ for political learning.200 
Baiocchi explains that they serve as forums in which activists from a range of areas, dealing with 
different issues may meet, interact, and learn from each other; in this way they facilitate greater 
solidarity and mobilisation in civil society.201 This is linked to the fact that connections made 
between activists in one space, are built upon in the range of other spaces in which these activists 
are active.202 In light of these benefits to civil society, Baiocchi argues that the theoretical question 
of the purpose of deliberation should be expanded to include the issues of empowerment, social 
justice, activism, and oppositional politics.203 
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4. Spaces for participation 
 
The spaces in which participation takes place are not neutral, those who create the space tend to 
define the processess and rules of the space and to hold more power to influence outcomes.204 
Gaventa refers to three types of spaces in which participation takes place: closed spaces to which 
only a few people have access, usually those already with power; invited spaces, which are those 
to which citizens are invited to participate, and which is typical of government-led participation 
processes; and invented (also called created or claimed) spaces – those spaces defined by citizens 
for engagement with the state.205 These invented spaces can include meetings called by citizens 
or citizen groups, public protest, engaging the media and building social consciousness on 
issues.206  
 
The opportunities for participation created by government tend to be top down; the public do not 
control the processes and instead of being considered a right of citizens they are bestowed as a 
benefit.207 By their very nature, participation processes of the legislatures are invited spaces. The 
issue, timing, format, agenda, venue and processes are defined by the legislatures, not by the 
people participating. Gaventa argues that it is important to question these, he argues for 
‘resistance from below’ to invited spaces, indicating that invented spaces are often created in 
rejection of closed and invited spaces, 208 similarly, Cornwall describes them as ‘organic spaces 
which emerge out of sets of common concerns.’209 Friedman and McKeiser argue for the 
importance of civil society building strategic alignments and power outside of the state in order to 
increase influence, not relying on proximity to and engagement with the state – which is out of 
the reach of many – but through civil society mobilisation.210 Certainly, investing in building the 
power and legitimacy of citizen-led invented spaces outside the spaces in which decisions are 
taken, can result in those groups having greater influence inside.211  
 
The Constitutional Court, referring to the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment on 
participation, refers to the importance of organisation among citizens to promote participation 
and explains that this is enabled by other fundamental civil and political rights.  
 
“Citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence 
through public debate and dialogue with their representatives or through their 
capacity to organize themselves. This participation is supported by ensuring 
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freedom of expression, assembly and association.”212 
 
Barnes et al argue that not only does mobilisation of social networks increase influence, the 
existence of strong networks also increases the extent to which citizens engage with the state. 
They explain that members of the public do not choose to become involved based only on their 
individual decisions, but that social networks play a significant role in this regard, with people 
more likely to participate when they have pre-existing social and political connections.213  
 
5. Participation and power 
 
At the heart of discussions on public participation and influence is the question of power. Often 
technical approaches to processes obscure the ‘political and power-laden controversial issues, 
such as those of resource access, control and equity’.214 Frequently, there are deep interests and 
significant resources or power at stake for some parties and the manifestations of these power 
relations are an obstacle to people realising their citizenship rights.215 It is essential that 
participation processes are alive to these currents, that they are recognised in the planning phase 
and facilitation of the process, and that measures are put in place to ensure the protection of 
people who participate.216 More importantly, consciousness-raising and building the capacity of 
people, through invented spaces, to push back against and equalise power, is essential.217  
 
The manifestations of power in political arenas cannot be simply expressed as one party having 
power over another and using that power in a negative way. Typically it is expressed as 
government with power and citizens without. It is more complex than that: power plays out 
between different individuals, groups of individuals and institutions, both in government and in 
civil society.218 Often the analysis fails to consider the different permutations of power and layers 
of contestation that are involved in decision-making processes.219  
 
Positive responses of decision-makers to public input within a process, are not always indicative 
of their actual position or willingness to promote the views of the public in the final decisions. 
Participants in Barnes et al’s study identified that even when public officials appeared to accept or 
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respond to citizen views in the forum, the lack of tangible outcomes belied that they were not 
taken seriously.220 This is exacerbated by a general failure to provide feedback on how the 
contributions were considered and if they affected the final decision.221 By predetermining the 
issues for discussion, which often didn’t include those issues that members of the public wanted 
to discuss, the respondents indicated that their ability to participate was further frustrated. In 
some instances respondents reflected on how deliberation on an issue, resulted in cooptation and 
‘incorporation’ into the state’s decisions, discourses and practices.222 
 
Another aspect of the complexity of power within the state, as Friedman and McKeiser stress, is 
that the state is not ‘monolithic’.223 Different individuals and agencies within the state hold 
different positions on issues and have varying levels of power. They argue that it is important that 
these differences ‘must be understood and utilised’ by civil society advocates as they ‘invent’ 




It is as important to think critically about the power manifest among civil society groups. There is 
a problematic assumption of equality within civil society, whereas different stakeholders in civil 
society have different levels of influence, frequently larger non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and academic institutions have greater resources and access to policy engagement 
opportunities. Within the process they are also more likely to meet the requirements of the 
engagement.225 It is notable that citizen structures and groups that exist prior to the opportunity 
for participation tend to be stronger in these spaces as well as taking a more proactive approach 
to engaging with them and influencing the outcomes.226 NGOs, which are often representative of 
more elite civil society, have an important role to provide information, support and mobilisation 
among local citizen groups and organisations that have fewer resources or less experience,227 but 
Friedman and McKeiser caution NGOs against seeking to ‘be the agency of the poor’, instead of 
providing support to help ‘unlock’ that agency.228 The UNSREPHR refers to the concept of ‘elite 
capture’ in which those who hold power within a community or civil society, use the platforms for 
engagement to reinforce inequality and exclusion.229 
 
Social Exclusion 
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Existing power relationships influence opportunities for participation, and these processes, 
depending on how they are implemented, may either reinforce or mitigate existing social 
exclusion, both within the participation process and in the broader social context.230 Deliberation 
and other participation processes which are presented as opportunities for people to engage on 
an equal basis, but which do not explicitly address power, are frequently dominated by those with 
more social power.231 In this context, these processes ‘create the fiction of rational deliberation’ 
while in reality serving dominant social groups and elites; through this they can legitimate 
inequality or the power of those who control the process.232 
 
Many participation processes fail to consider how invitation, venue, time of day, social norms and 
local power hierarchies may exclude affected stakeholders from the engagement. Without this 
consideration, broader exclusion and inequalities within society may be exacerbated and the 
privilege of elites promoted.233 The Centre for Public Participation illustrates the extent to which 
local civil society groups experience this exclusion:  
 
“Groups … [from] civil society … spoke of mixed experiences of the policy process. Feelings 
of being sidelined and marginalised, excluded and disempowered overwhelmingly 
dominated. These were occasioned by... not being recognised as worthy of 
participating”.234 
 
Addressing inequality, requires that the particular vulnerabilities of different people and groups of 
people are taken into account when designing participation processes. It requires an active 
approach to ensure that groups such as children, youth, persons with disabilities, women, elderly 
people, people living in rural or poor contexts are able to prepare for, attend and, once in 
attendance, participate on equal terms in the deliberations. Recognising that participation 
processes often don’t change power hierarchies within people’s context outside of the 
participation, provisions must be made for people to participate without disclosing their 
identities. 
 
Not only does inequality and power affect who has access to deliberative forums, it can 
significantly affect what takes place within the forum.235 The ‘rules of engagement’ are seldom 
neutral, technically defined rules may be employed, adapted or rejected in order to afford some 
people greater opportunity to influence the process and thus serve a particular agenda. This is 
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most pronounced in respect of the management of partiality, differences of opinion and dissent in 
the deliberative exchange.236 The issue of whose voice ‘counts’ is significant, the contributions of 
some people may be valued or considered more legitimate than others based on what they say, 
how they say it and who they are. In this way, the style of discourse that is legitimised in the 
exchange can encourage or discourage participation.237 State officials tend to emphasise more 
‘rational’, technical, and procedural discourse whereas members of the public more often utilise a 
lay or experiential approach that may be considered emotional. This favours civil society elites 
and the approach may alienate community oriented activists and members of the public more 
broadly.238 Baiocchi discusses the ways in which language manifests as a form of power, stating 
that the interactions between speakers are expressions of the power relations that exist between 
them.239 He argues that this manifests in the ability of different speakers to meet the technical 
requirements of the exchange and also disallows certain people from engaging in some forms of 
speech so, in addition to technical ‘competence’, speakers must also have the standing to 
participate in the debate.240 
 
Biaocchi argues that expecting isolated deliberative processes to eliminate existing social 
inequalities is unreasonable.241 However, in a study which took place over a five year period, he 
found that the longer that people engaged in these processes, the greater the levels of equality 
between participants.242 This is noted in the study with particular reference to the participation of 
women and people who have lower levels of education, who indicated a greater degree of 
engagement in the processes after five years.243 In other words, when conceptualised over longer 
periods of time, deliberative processes have the potential to foster parity within those spaces. 
 
Representation and legitimacy  
The concept of representation has different meanings in the context of participation. There is the 
formal political understanding of representation derived from elections which gives political 
actors the authority to act on behalf of citizens. However, within citizen groups this can be 
understood to mean representation by means of a mandate from a wider interest group (be they 
formal or informal networks) or representation resulting from personal or social characteristics, 
such as experience of a particular situation, gender, race, economic status, or disability.244 
Questions of representation, inform decisions about who should be engaged, as well as claims by 
citizens to speak on behalf of others. Both government officials and members of the public lay 
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claim to authority derived from the discourse of representation in order to legitimise and 
strengthen the impact of their positions. To do this they ‘mobilise particular identities as 
legitimate and others as marginal to the topic under discussion’ through the discourses they 
employ.245 Legitimacy is negotiated and the notion of ‘the public’ is frequently constructed in 
ways that serve those with power, either within government or within civil society.246 Defining 
who should participate and what the value of their participation is, is affected both by subtle 
negotiation and ‘overt conflict that manifest in decisions of who should participate and howe 
seriously they should be taken.247 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights cautions that NGOs do not 
automatically represent excluded groups just because they have taken up their cause.248 Elitism in 
civil society must be challenged, in particular when people claim to represent or speak on behalf 
of others, yet do so without mandate and in the absence of feedback and accountability 
processes.249 
 
6. Resistance to embedding participatory and deliberative practice into established political 
systems 
 
Effective participation processes which go beyond token technical exercises and promote the 
empowerment of citizens in the process, by their nature, create a scenario where the public 
oversee and critique public officials, which creates tensions that must be managed.250 As a 
consequence these exercises should challenge prevailing power. Biaocchi explains that it is 
therefore reasonable to expect resistance from those who hold power, arguing that the more 
aligned a participatory process is to meaningful participation, or ‘true deliberative democracy’, the 
more it is likely to have a redistributive outcome.251 He goes further to state:  
“A sociologically realistic expectation about any kind of empowered deliberative setting 
that redistributes a good toward the less powerful is that it will meet opposition from 
more powerful organized groups invested in the previous distributive scheme.”252  
 
For these reasons it follows, that deepening spaces for effective and meaningful participation 
does not necessarily serve the interests of those with power, which goes some way to explaining 
the generally weak implementation of these processes.  
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The existance of a policy imperative to implement participation or deliberative processes alone 
does not result in them automatically achieving the goals of that policy. Depending on how the 
formal and informal rules and norms for participation are constructed, understood or 
implemented they affect the possibility of the public participation processes influencing the 
outcomes.253 Linked to this issue of potential influence, Baiocchi raises two key considerations in 
theorising deliberative democratic theory. Firstly, the need to understand the ‘institutional 
capacity and autonomy’ of government agencies and structures to implement such processes and, 
secondly, consideration of the ‘driving politics’ that infuse deliberative processes.254 A study of 
participation processes in the British context found that, in spite of being motivated by policy 
requirements, they remained subject to established power within the structures facilitating the 
participation. As such, the concepts of participation and deliberation ‘were overlaid on, rather 
than displaced, ‘old’ professional, organisational and political frameworks of action.255 This was 
evident in the prevalence of norms of professionalism which value expertise above opinion and 
lived experience; the pre-eminance of the belief in and practices of representative rather than 
participatory democracy; and norms in which decision making power is concentrated centrally in 
structures and institutions. Barnes et al found that these established norms are ‘resilient’ and 
limit the extent to which deliberative spaces can influence outcomes.256 
 
Achieving participation as envisaged within a human rights framework, requires a shift not only in 
the activities of institutions, which is often driven by policy requirements, but also a shift in the 
culture of institutions. A shift in the culture and values of the institution will not occur simply 
through the iteration of the principles in a framework; it requires measures to build the capacity 
of and shift the values held by public representatives who implement these processes. Without 
leadership and investment into making these shifts, participation and deliberation will remain a 
box checking exercise in which people are co-opted into supporting predetermined outcomes 





The trajectory away from the developmental concept of participation to formulations that 
incorporate rights and embed not only participation but specifically deliberative participation, in 
political theory is important as it gives greater meaning to our understanding of citizenship rights 
within participatory democracies. The concept of deliberative democracy is particularly critical to 
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develop systems of democracy in which citizens can meaningfully engage the state under 
circumstances that allow for a range of positions and ideas to be debated.  
 
By and large, state institutions are failing to incorporate the full intent of the legal and policy 
frameworks into their practices. This is partly due to a lack of institutional capacity and 
mechanisms, however the primary reason is the failure to address the manifestations of power 
through the structuring of participatory processes. Technical approaches to participation are 
utilised to fulfil the policy requirements without the risk of them upsetting established political or 
social power. However, the manner in which power is understood, recognised and addressed is 
central to the effectiveness of these processes as sites of citizen engagement. Without this they 
will continue to fail in achieving their goals of greater connectivity between the state and citizens, 
empowerment of citizens or improved government performance which is responsive to the will of 
citizens.  
 
While there is strong evidence that poorly conceived and implemented participation exercises can 
entrench inequality, when implemented in line with the principles of rights-based approaches 
they are associated with a number of positive effects that go beyond the outcomes specific to the 
issue under discussion, particularly in generating deliberative processes which increase 
understanding and result in more rational decision making. They have the potential to improve 
tolerance and strengthen relationships between different groups of people, and in that way build 
civil society.258 They can also empower citizens and, when implemented over a period of time, 
push back against embedded social inequalities that bedevil these spaces.  
 
The responsibility for creating spaces for engagement does not lie only with the state; citizens 
and, in particular, well-resourced organisations, must also claim that role within the democratic 
state. In addition to creating spaces for engagement, citizens must consider how they can lay 
better claim to invited spaces; and how the opportunities provided by the state can be better 
used through proactive mobilisation on issues that concern different groups. However, bearing in 
mind that the power to define the process and rules of engagement still lies with the state 
institution, it is important not to be naïve about the extent that invited spaces can be claimed.  
 
For the legislatures, specifically, there are limitations on the extent to which they can implement 
real deliberative processes on macro political and policy issues. This is further heightened when 
considering the levels of political contestation manifest in this sphere of government, in terms of 
the interactions of different political parties, which means it is questionable to what extent is in 
their interests to promote stronger forms of deliberation and participation with the public.  
 
                                                        




The performance of South Africa’s legislatures 
 
1. Introduction  
 
There is a wealth of literature focused on South Africa’s legislatures, particularly relating to their 
independence, performance in terms of holding the executive to account, and the quality of law-
making. However, and in spite of significant literature on South African public participation with 
local government, there’s far less written on public participation with the legislatures.  
 
In this chapter I consider the range of avenues to for public participation in the legislatures, 
exploring developments in participation in law-reform before focusing on the emerging systems 
for oversight and public participation in relation to this, as well as the extent to which civil society 
are utilizing these opportunities. Finally in this section I provide an overview of a range of other 
mechanisms for public engagement with the legislatures and discuss their strengths and 
weaknesses. Throughout, I draw on examples to demonstrate how public opinion fares when 
pitted against firm positions of the dominant political party on specific issues. In the following 
section I elaborate on the systemic barriers to public participation in the legislatures.  
 
I then turn to questions of the performance of civil society, exploring the extent to which 
organisations strategically utilise methods aimed at creating spaces for political engagement and 
if these are effectively staking greater claim on the potential for participation presented by the 
constitutional framework. To conclude this section I consider the issues of power and inequality 
within civil society and possible strategies to address this.  
  
It’s important to understand where political decisions, relating to the work of the legislatures, are 
taken and the limits that this places on the potential for influence through public interaction with 
committees alone. This provides some context to an elaboration on some examples drawn from 
the past ten years in which committees utilise their authority to define the rules of engagement in 
participation processes, which may in turn serve broader political agendas.  
 
 
2. The scope for public participation and engagement with the legislatures 
 
There are a range of formal mechanisms through which members of the public can interact with 
members of parliament and of the provincial legislatures.  
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2.1. Participation in law reform 
 
The primary focus of parliament during the first 15 years of democracy was on law reform aimed 
at transforming South African society.259  This included the development of complex legislation 
that was linked to significant social transformation through policies aimed at redressing the 
injustices of apartheid law and policy.260 The Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of 
Parliament (RIPAP) points out that the fast pace of law reform during the first phases of our 
democracy meant that at times, these laws were not sufficiently scrutinised.261 While the public 
participation in developing the Constitution was significant,262 the full picture of the extent and 
nature of public participation in the development of the other pieces of legislation during the 
1990s is unclear.263 It’s therfore not surprising that systems and standards for public participation 
in law reform are, with interventions by the courts, relatively well developed and that civil society 
engagement with these is relatively strong, Muntingh undertook a study of public participation in 
the National Assembly (NA) committees between 2007 and 2010 which showed that over 79 per 
cent of submissions made related to law reform.264 Based on this study, Muntingh argues that the 
motivations for civil society involvement in the legislatures includes the level of politicisation and 
controversy related to the bill, or the pre-existance of organised civil society groups focussed on 
the particular issue.265 
 
It is clear on reading the provisions of the Constitution, the DfL judgement and the rules of 
Parliament that the requirement for ‘public involvement in the legislative and other functions’266 
of the legislatures does not necessarily mean that they must host public hearings. When a bill is 
published it must allow people the opportunity to comment,267 but this may be achieved through 
accepting written comment on a bill. The discretion of the legislatures to define the extent and 
nature of the processes they follow is cemented by the Constitutional Court decision in DfL. 268 
Public participation in the law-making functions typically follows a process through which the 
public provide the relevant NA and National Council of Provinces (NCOP) committees with written 
                                                        
259 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P28 
260 Murray C. and Nijzink L. 2002. Building Representative Democracy - South Africa’s Legislatures and the Constitution. 
p74. In RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P24. The RIPAP indicates that In 1998 the number of bills and acts on which Parliament 
worked peaked at over 250, thereafter the number declined significantly and by 2006 that number was less than 30. 
P28 
261 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P24 
262 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P15 
263 February J. 2006. ‘More than a law-making production line? Parliament and its oversight role’.  State of the Nation: 
South Africa 2005 – 2006. S.Buhlungu S. Daniel J. Southhall R. and Lutchman J. (Eds). HSRC Press. P136.  
264 Muntingh L. 2012. ‘The state of civil society participation in Parliament’. Law, Development and Democracy. 29:48. P 
34 
265 Muntingh. 2012. Ibid. P33. The issues that stimulated the greatest level of public input during that period were bills 
dealing with the closure of the Scorpions, the National Youth Development Agency, the 11-year review of the 
implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, the Protection of Personal Information Bill and the Choice of Termination 
of Pregnancy bill. 
266 Act 108 of 1996. Sections 59(1)(a); 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a). 
267 NA Rules. Ibid. Rule 249(1) 
268 DfL. Ibid. Para 128 
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submissions after which some are invited to make oral submissions. It is however notable that 
NCOP committees are significantly less likely to call for public comment or host hearings than NA 
committees are.269 February’s analysis in 2006 also highlights the weaker role of the NCOP, she 
states that the NCOP ‘has been hidden by the long shadow of the NA’.270  
 
There is evidence of provincial legislatures (PLs) paying significant attention to facilitating public 
hearings on some bills over the past 10 years. When a ‘bill affecting the provinces’271 is processed 
through the PLs, most facilitate public hearings in towns across the provinces.272 However the PLs, 
as with Parliament, have discretion as to if they hold public hearings or not and regarding the 
extent of those hearings. It is difficult to establish from any record on what basis the decision is 
taken to invest in public participation at this level, however it appears, as is the case with 
Parliament, that this is related to the level of political and public interest in the issue.273 The 
discretion to decide on if and how to implement public participation leads to extremely uneven 
implementation across provinces at times.274 
 
The processing of some bills has resulted in significant public consultation processes which are 
implemented in rural towns and villages, led by the PLs, I’ll provide two examples. Regarding the 
Traditional Courts Bill [B1 of 2012] (TCB) the PLs hosted a total of 30 hearings across the nine 
provinces in the first half of 2012.275 26 of these 30 hearings were attended by approximatly 6 688 
people and 510 oral submissions were recorded at 25 by civil society monitors from the Alliance 
for Rural Democracy (ARD).276 These provincial public hearings were additional to hearings hosted 
                                                        
269 Muntingh. 2012. Ibid. P35. Muntingh’s study illustrates that NCOP committees received a total of 7 submissions 
compared to the 281 submissions received by NA committees during the four year period. 
270 February. 2006. Ibid. P127  
271 Act 108 of 1996. Section 76 
272 Reading the provincial mandates prepared by Provincial Legislatures on the Housing Development Agency bill [B1 of 
2008]; the Restitution and Land Rights Amendment bill [B35 of 2013]; the National Credit Amendment Bill [B47 of 
2013]; the Children’s Act Amendment Bill [B19F of 2006]; and the Traditional Courts Bill {B1 of 2012]; most provinces 
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documents can be found on numerous websites including the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website, the Children’s 
Institute and the Centre for Law and Society.  
273 By searching the term ‘public hearings’ and the name of a PL, one is able to ascertain from the online presence, 
which bills PLs advertised for or reported on as having hosted public hearings. However the PLs online footprint is weak 
and it is thus difficult to establish the full picture of public hearings hosted by a legislature unless a civil society 
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and the Children’s Act Amendment Bill (in 2006 and 2007) as bills on which there were significant public participation 
processes at provincial level. 
274 For example in the processing of the Housing Development Agency Bill [B1 of 2008] during 2008, while the Eastern 
Cape Legislature reported hosting 32 public hearings, the Gauteng and Limpopo Legislatures only hosted one each, and 
the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal Legislatures’ negotiating mandates make no mention of public hearings. A record 
of the negotiating mandates from all provinces can be accessed on the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9263/ accessed on 14 February 2015. The record for the North West 
Legislature’s negotiating mandate is accessible at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20110729/83954_1.pdf accessed on 14 February 
2015.  
275 Information obtained from Center for Law and Society and the Alliance for Rural Democracy (ARD) monitoring 
reports on the hearings. 
276 ARD. The information on attendance is not available for four hearings, and information on the number of 
submissions made is not available for five hearings.  
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by the NA in 2008 at which 21 written and 16 oral submissions were recorded;277 and later in 2012 
hearings hosted by the NCOP at which 67 written and 31 oral submissions were recorded. 278  
Similarly PLs invested in broad consultations on the Children’s Act Amendment Bill [B19B of 2006] 
during 2006 and 2007. The negotiating mandates indicate that 25 hearings were held in the six 
provinces that recorded this information.279 While the Eastern Cape Legislature does not provide 
detail regarding how many hearings they hosted, the negotiating mandate indicates that they 
hosted hearings between the 23rd and 26th of October 2006.280 Once again this was in addition to 
public hearings hosted by the NA in September 2007.281 Interestingly in addition to these 
processes the NA undertook ‘community consultations’ in eight towns in four provinces.282  
 
These examples demonstrate a growing sophistication in the mechanisms for public involvement 
in the law making functions of the legislatures and greater attention being paid to ensuring that 
these opportunities are accessible to people across the country. 
 
2.2. Participation in oversight and the impact of legislation 
 
The oversight and accountability functions of legislatures are at the heart of the delivery of 
human rights, addressing inequality, building infrastructure, delivering services and tackling 
poverty in the country. Failures in service delivery such as textbooks not being delivered to 
schools or clinics not having essential medicine stocks are as much a failure of the legislatures 
oversight as it is a failure of the executive to perform.283 Yet in spite of the constitutional mandate 
that public participation must take place in the legislative and other functions of the legislatures 
most public participation relates to law reform and not these processes of the legislatures. 284 
Much of the policy, law and academic focus of public participation has been on law making and 
                                                        
277  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080513-traditional-courts-bill-b15-2008-department-justice-briefing-and-publ 
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282 Jamieson L. 2007b. Children’s Amendment Bill Progress Update: 17 July 2007. Children’s Institute, University of Cape 
town. Accessed at  http://www.ci.org.za/depts/ci/plr/pdf/progress/ProgressUpdate17July2007.pdf on 14 February 
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283 Ben-Zeev. 2014. Ibid. P40 
284 Muntingh. 2012. Ibid. P34. The study indicates that only nine per cent of public engagement related to oversight or 
accountability. 
 42 
not oversight, and similarly the focus on the oversight roles of parliament has been weak in 
addressing public participation in this regard.285  
 
The terms oversight and accountability are frequently used interchangeably, however in their 
Report on Parliamentary oversight and accountability (Corder Report) Corder et al, define the 
differences between these concepts, explaining that accountability in the context of the 
legislatures relates to state entities or individuals within the executive arm of government being 
required to ‘explain and justify … their decisions or actions’, they indicate that accountability is 
strongly linked to requirements that where there is evidence of wrongdoing or errors, that the 
parties responsible make reparations for this and take action to prevent this from taking place in 
the future.286 They explain that oversight includes a broader range of activities through which the 
legislatures monitor and review the actions of the Executive.287 The Corder Report argues that 
both concepts are central to democracy, explaining that they give powers to the legislatures to 
‘ensure that the executive is carrying out its mandate, monitor the implementation of its 
legislative policy and draw on these experiences for future law-making’.288 The report further 
argues that accountability encourages opennes of government and strengthens the confidence of 
the public in government.289  
 
Parliament’s approach to accountability and oversight has generally been poor, 290 and strong 
oversight has evidently been dependent on the nature of the issue at hand, the approach of 
senior MPs, and the strength of the ANC party position on the issue.291 In addition, February 
suggests that parliament have approached its duty to assert itself over the executive in this regard 
‘hesitantly’,292 with the consequence of decreasing the trust of the public in the institution.293 She 
argues that during the first ten years of democracy, Parliament ‘struggled to define and interpret 
its oversight role’.294 Both February and van der Westhuizen argue that the investigations into the 
Arms Deal were a significant test of parliament’s role to hold the state accountable and ultimately 
demonstrated the lack of political capacity of the institution to do this.295 Van der Westhuizen 
further argues that this ‘set the tone’ for parliamentary oversight going forward.296  
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various documentation of the legislatures. Generally articles dealing with oversight and accountability fail to 
incorporate commentary on the state of public participation in this and articles on public participation focus on this in 
respect of law reform. 
286 Corder H, Jagwanth S, & Soltau F. 1999. Report on Parliamentary oversight and accountability. Faculty of Law, 
University of Cape Town. Accessed at https://pmg.org.za/files/docs/oversight&account.htm on 15 February 2015 
287 Corder et al. 1999. Ibid. 
288 Corder et al. 1999. Ibid. 
289 Corder et al. 1999. Ibid. 
290 February. 2006. Ibid. P123. And Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P52 
291 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P100  
292 February. 2006. Ibid. P129. 
293 February. 2006. Ibid. P126. 
294 February. 2006. Ibid. P123. 
295 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P32; and February. 2006. Ibid. P124 
296 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P32 
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Parliament has dragged its feet in addressing its poor oversight performance, February supports 
this in her paper written in 2006, in which she argues that Parliament’s insipid response to the 
Corder report of 1999 at that stage demonstrated the institution’s reluctance to strengthen this 
aspect of its work.297 Subsequently there has been a growing recognition by Parliament of the 
need for it to strengthen its oversight capacity.298 Van der Westhuizen argues that at the 
beginning of its term in 2009, the 4th Parliament seemed imbued with a new enthusiasm for 
effective oversight and she provides a range of examples from different committees at the time to 
support this.299 
 
In addition to the Constitutional framework, more structured architecture to enable these 
functions is lacking. The then Speaker of the NA, Max Sisulu addresses this in his speech on the 
budget of Parliament in 2011, indicating that these functions of Parliament will be improved 
through the implementation of the Oversight and Accountability Model.300 This model was 
finalised in 2009, and broadly addresses the mechanisms for oversight and accountability, 
including making recommendations for changes to the current rules of the NA to improve this.301 
Reference to public participation is weak in this document; it simply articulates that public 
participation in the oversight functions of Parliament must be addressed, stating that this should 
be achieved in a separate model.302 Further, there are some aspects of parliamentary oversight, 
which by their very nature involve the public that are addressed.303 In 2012, the Oversight model 
of the South African Legislative Sector (SOM) was launched. It draws significantly from the 
Oversight and Accountability Model and applies not only to Parliament but also to the PLs. A 
notable difference is the clear and detailed articulation of the oversight cycles of the legislatures 
and importantly, the integration of public and stakeholder engagement in this.304 However, the 
sheer volume of oversight-related meetings raises the question of the extent to which it will be 
possible for the extensive standards articulated to be fully realised.305  
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Public participation in annual monitoring cycles of departmental budgeting, planning and 
reporting can provide legislatures with an indication of citizen priorities and is critical to ensure 
that legislatures have access to external information to verify information obtained from the 
executive; to rely solely on departments for information on their own performance is 
counterintuitive to oversight.306 However while they sound the right note, these models are 
aspirational, unlike the rules of the legislatures they are not enforceable. February, in 2006 argues 
that elected representatives generally lack political will to fully exercise their oversight and 
accountability functions,307 this sentiment, linked to the implications of the closed-list system, was 
repeated by a range of delegates at a civil society conference on South Africa’s Legislatures in 
2012.308 Without political will, its questionable if these models or any other aspect of the 
framework for accountability and oversight will be effectively enforced. 
 
It’s notable that some members of the legislatures have argued that the issue is not political will, 
rather the lack of capacity and resources within the legislatures to access independent 
information and undertake effective oversight.309 While it’s unlikely that MPs and MPLs 
themselves will acknowledge that they lack the political mettle to assert themselves over the 
executive, van der Westhuizen undertook interviews with past MPs who clearly articulate that the 
issue is one of politics, not logistics or capacity. She quotes former MP Sisa Njikelana saying: “… 
from time to time we monitor and give direction to things. The style of leadership will be informed 
by the precepts of the ANC.”310; and another former ANC MP who states: “… and you must not go 
and counter the Minister, publically or even in the committee, or even in caucus, because they will 
pull rank”.311 I’m not suggesting that the capacity and resource concerns are not relevant, rather 
that addressing them alone without dealing with the bigger political motivations that weaken 
oversight, will not resolve the problem. 
 
Although less pronounced than their interactions on legislation, civil society has not been 
completely absent in engaging directly with parliament on oversight or accountability. While the 
public have been vocal over the years, particularly through the mechanism of mass media, 
regarding significant political questions of accountability, this has less frequently resulted in direct 
engagements between the public and the legislatures. Since 2010, a growing number of civil 
society organisations or networks have put engaging with parliament’s oversight role over 
departments in a systemic and sustained manner at the core of their work.312 However, these 
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contributions are frequently initiated by civil society and seldom at the invitation of 
committees.313  
 
Monitoring the implementation of legislation 
The legislatures should not only perform oversight over the general performance of departments, 
it’s also essential that they consider the implementation of the legislation that has been passed 
since 1994.314 Importantly the RIPAP suggests that Parliament must consider how the content of 
legislation can facilitate legislative monitoring and oversight over the implementation of that 
legislation.315 Requiring departments to report regularly on implementation can enable 
Parliament to identify any flaws or gaps in the legislation itself as well as problems with 
departmental programmes and plans.316 Further it is of particular importance when the 
implementation of the legislation requires coordination between departments as it can provide a 
forum for coordinated oversight between different committees.317 
 
But strong oversight provisions in legislation are not in the interests of the executive, particularly 
in respect of highly politically charged issues, February describes the battle between the 
Parliamentary committees and the executive in this regard during the development of the 
National Conventional Arms Control bill (B50B of 2001) in 2002.318 She illustrates how in spite of 
support from the parliamentary committee and civil society for a provision in that act which 
would require parliamentary oversight over executive decisions, the Act was passed without this 
provision.319  
 
Three acts stand out for their express provisions for parliamentary oversight. The Domestic 
Violence Act (DVA), the Criminal Law [Sexual Offences and Related Matters] Amendment Act 
(SOA) and the Child Justice Act (CJA) include express provisions for regular parliamentary 
oversight of the implementation of those laws.320 Parliament’s implementation of these 
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provisions in respect of the SOA and CJA has been weak, there is only a record of two meetings 
hosted by the Justice committee and one meeting hosted by the Committee on Women, Children 
and Persons with Disabilities (WCPD) over the past seven years regarding the SOA and no 
evidence of calls for public comment in these.321 The legislatures have fared only slightly better 
regarding the CJA In the time from its promulgation in 2008 to date there have been five meetings 
hosted by three different committees.322 Only one of these meetings included civil society 
submissions.323 It’s notable that the BRRRs for the justice committee over four years all refer to 
the issue of oversight over this act, in these, the Committee repeatedly raises that it intends to 
meet with all government and civil society stakeholders, eventually in 2013, the committee’s 
BRRR indicates that time constraints have prevented such meetings.324 
 
Parliament’s performance regarding oversight over the implementation of the DVA has been 
more significant, particularly since 2007. Two committees, the Police and WCPD Committees, 
have met a total of 20 times to assess the implementation of the Act and develop responses to 
strengthen this,325 and while inviting pubic submissions on this issues has not been common for 
the police committee, the WCPD Committee was relatively strong on including calls for public 
submissions on the issue.326  
 
Overall, Parliament are extremely inconsistent in the manner in which they conduct oversight into 
the implementation of these pieces of legislation, this relates not only to the irregularity of 
meetings for this purpose, but also the fact that it only relates to certain government 
departments at times and the lack of standards regarding requirements for public input into 
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2009; 08 and 15 September 2009; 27 and 28 October 2009; 03, 10 and 17 November 2009; 08 November 2011; 25 June 
2012; and 06 November 2013, accessed at https://pmg.org.za/committee/51/ on 16 February 2015. 
326 The processes hosted by the committee between August and November 2009 included public hearings on the 
implementation of the Act. accessed at https://pmg.org.za/committee/51/ on 16 February 2015. 
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these.327 Reading the BRRRs clearly demonstrates the failure of the legislatures to follow up on 
their own recommendations to themselves or to enforce their recommendations to the 
departments concerned over time.328  
 
Impact of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 
The Money Bills Act  for the first time, gave Parliament the power to amend the medium term 
budget policy statement (MTBPS) and ensures that this process is open to public scrutinty.329 Van 
der Westhuizen compares the reports of the Finance Committee and indicates that there is little 
significant difference in the recommendations made in the period before and after the 
promulgation of the Act, she argues that this is due to the lack of increased capacity of MPs to 
effectively engage with the technical and complex budgeting terrain.330 In addition the provisions 
mandating public participation in the Finance and Appropriation committees has not significanly 
affected public contributions in these. An analysis of the committee records available on the PMG 
website between 2006 and 2014 shows that there has been an increase in the number of 
stakeholders that make submissions,331 however this is minimal. in October 2006 four 
stakeholders interacted with the committees, between 2010 and 2014 that increased to between 
eight and ten bodies commenting on the Fiscal Framework and Revenue proposals which take 
place in February or March every year.332 These submissions are dominated by private sector 
stakeholders which usually accounts for five or six of the submissions received by the 
Committees.333 Organised labour has maintained a steady presence over the years, typically two 
structures representing unions participate each year.334 NGOs and civil society coalitions have 
engaged almost every year since 2008, however this is usually only one organisation or coalition, 
however in 2011 three different coalitions or organisations made submissions, subsequently this 
has dwindled back to one, and in March 2013, there were no submissions from NGOs or 
coalitions.335  
 
Overall the legislatures are deminstrating greater consciousness of their oversight role, however 
there is very little integration of public participation into this and the development of the 
framework for this does not (and probably cannot) address the question of political motivation for 
improved oversight. As such the commitment of legislatures to oversight appears to remains low 
and is only marginally mitigated by the development of its oversight models. Tellingly, the Judicial 
                                                        
327 Wakefield and Waterhouse. 2014. Ibid. p 9 and p14 
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330 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. P97 
331 Records of meetings dated: 31 October 2006; 29 February 2008; 24 25 February 2010; 28 February and 01 March 
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Matters Amendment Bill [B2 of 2015] on which the Justice committee has yet to deliberate 
includes provisions to water down the comprehensive requirements for annual reporting on the 
implementation of the SOA and CJA.336  
 
2.3. Sectoral parliaments; Taking Parliament and the Legislatures to the People and Petitions 
 
Parliament hosts ‘sectoral parliaments’ to highlight the issues of specific groups, such as youth, 
women, labour and people with disabilities. In spite of there having been no evaluation of these, 
Parliament claims that the sectoral parliaments are ‘successful’.337 In contrast, both the RIPAP and 
civil society organisations have questioned their effectiveness, raising concern regarding their 
failure to engage with marginalised groups, as they favour attendance by elite stakeholders from 
government, political parties and better-resourced NGOs; there is weak or non existant follow up 
on processes; 338 and the excessive spending associated with hosting these large once-off 
events.339 
 
The legislatures have also emphasised the programmes of Taking Parliament to the People 
(TPTTP) and Taking Legislatures to the People (TLTTP). Through these it seeks to improve 
engagements between MPs and MPLs and people living in rural areas.340 These have some 
measure of success in bringing different spheres of government together into one room with 
citizens to address service delivery issues for greater coordination across the spheres of 
government.341 The primary critique of these processes is once again that they mostly don’t have 
significant influence and are little more than ‘talk shops’ in which follow up processes are 
extremely poor.342  
 
The petitions process is intended as a mechanism through which citizens can engage directly with 
the legislatures, via contacting the constituency MP or the Speaker’s office.343  Although a 
Petitions Framework was recently developed,344 the entry points are opaque to most people.345 
This coupled with the requirment that petitions must be made in writing makes this system 
inaccessible to the citizens, it favours better-resourced and literate people and is most unavailable 
                                                        
336 Judicial Matters Amendment Bill [B2 of 2015] clauses 15, 16 and 19 
337 PPF. 2013. Ibid. Pp26-27 
338 Ben-Zeev. 2014. Ibid. P25 and RIPAP P54 
339 RIPAP. Ibid.  P64 
340 PPF. 2013. Ibid. 
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342 Ben-Zeev. 2014. Ibid. P24 
343 PPF. 2013. Ibid. Pp52-54 
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South African Legislative Sector. 2013. 
345 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. p63 
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to those who have the most at stake.346 Although this avenue for participation is seldom 
invoked,347 when it is, its had little success.348 
 
These initiatives have the potential to improve citizens’ access to the legislatures, however 
significant challenges currently impact on their effectiveness. Most notably that they tend to be 
framed as once-off events and fail to incorporate effective follow up on the issues raised between 
the legislatures and the executive and with the citizens who participate through these, the recent 
PPF seeks to address this through incorporating requirements for feedback throughout.349 The 
poor follow through on many of these initiatives poses a danger because poorly implemented 
participation processes, where there is no evidence of them affecting decisions, tend to deepen 
frustration, helplessness and mistrust in elected representatives.350  
 
2.4. Constituency offices 
 
Constituency offices have been established in an attempt to enhance the contact between 
elected representatives and citizens at local level. 351 Legislatures allocate time in their 
programmes for MPs and MPLs to conduct their constituency work. 352  
 
However, South Africa’s is not a constituency based electoral system; as such constituency work is 
not embedded in, but rather layered over the proportional representation system.353 The RIPAP 
found that constituency offices were not functioning well; attributing this to the fact that they are 
unstructured and that constituency work is not prescribed.354 The report also found that neither 
elected representatives nor members of the public understood the roles and functions of these 
offices.355 Delegates at a civil society conference on South Africa’s Legislatures, and at a 
community workshop preceding this conference also indicated that members of the public are 
seldom aware of the existance of these offices, where they are located or what their role is.356 
Parliament has also acknowledged that the constituency offices are poorly resouced and that 
                                                        
346 PPF. 2013. Ibid. Pp5 
347 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. p63 
348 Ben-Zeev K and Waterhouse S. 2012. Not Waiting for an Invitation: lessons from South African civil society 
engagement with National Parliament in 2011. Pp27-28. This describes a case in which the Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy 
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349 PPF. 2013. Ibid.  
350 Manor J. 2004 p9 in Hicks & Buccus. 2007. Ibid. P99 
351 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. P7 
352 PPF. 2013. Ibid. P35 
353 February. 2006. Ibid. P135. 
354 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. Pp 58-59 
355 RIPAP. 2009. Ibid. p60 
356 Ben-Zeev. 2014. Ibid. P26 
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constituency time for MPs and MPLs is limited.357 Currently this time is unmonitored leading to a 
lack of accountability.358  
 
The implementation of constituency work is dependent primarily on the approach of the specific 
MP as to if it is effective or not.359 The overall performance of MPs regarding their constituency 
work is dismal, in an exercise where she telephoned a number of constituency offices during 
allocated constituency time, van der Westhuizen found very few MPs accessible through their 
constituency offices.360 However, supporting February’s assertion that the effectiveness is 
dependent on the MP, a small proportion of those telephone calls yeilded conversations with MPs 
who were clearly very committed to their constituency work.361  
 
 
3. Limitations on access 
 
There are a number of issues which are procedural or technical in nature that significantly impact 
on the possibility of sectors of the public participating and on the quality of that engagement. 
These relate to the places where these exercises are hosted, the times at which they take place, 
notification of opportunities, and access to different forms of information to enable meaningful 
engagement.  
 
3.1. Geography and timing 
 
The site of the national legislature coupled with vast rural areas across the country, and the 
associated costs and time required to travel to Parliament means that it is seldom possible for 
people to come to Parliament.362 While one would expect the provincial legislatures to be more 
accessible, this is not the case, there is more evidence of citizen engagement at Parliament then 
at the Provincial Legislatures.  
 
Measures such as TLTP and public hearings hosted in towns across the country are designed to 
address this problem of geography,363 however they can only go so far. The notion of ‘public 
access’ and ‘engagement’ could be interpreted beyond physical presence to include other more 
creative means of people engaging directly with MPs and MPLs on issues. Using social media and 
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http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/christivanderwesthuizen/2014/02/19/parliament-20-shrinking-the-accountability-
deficit/ accessed 25 February 2014 
359 February. 2006. Ibid. P135. 
360 Van der Westhuizen. 2014. Ibid. Pp87-88 
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other forms of electronic communication, as well as improved implementation of provisions for 
constituency work are but two measures that can help to narrow the geographical gap between 




Access to information is fundamental to public participation,365 addressing weaknesses in access 
to information on processes and opportunities for participation is arguably more critical than 
addressing physical geographic concerns. Lack of information about the legislatures, their 
processes and opportunities for engagement lies more solidly behind lack of access than distance 
does. Inadequate and short notification of invited opportunities, is the most frequently cited 
information-related barrier to public participation,366 however there are three other aspects of 
the information barrier that are relevant.  
 
Firstly, the majority of the public express a lack of knowledge and understanding regarding the 
overall role and purpose of the legislatures, their structures and processes, as well as the 
framework for public participation.367 At a community workshop hosted in Khayelitsha in 2012, 
participants indicated that they perceived public participation in the legislatures to be related to 
demonstrations and marches.368  Secondly, access to the schedule of meetings and activities of 
legislatures enables the public to identify issues on the agenda ahead of schedule and prepare for 
interactions relating to these. Parliament provides the schedules of committee meetings for the 
NA and NCOP on its website, and generally updates these weekly.369 The notice provided by these 
schedules favours organisations that are poised to interact with the legislatures and is seldom 
sufficient time for citizens outside of the Western Cape to attend those meetings.370 It’s also 
notable that there are large swathes of the population who don’t have access to the internet.371 A 
search of the websites of PLs shows that this information is almost non-existent at this level, since 
there’s no information on what is being considered, participation is rendered almost impossible. 
Given that it is provincial departments that are responsible for service delivery on most socio-
economic rights issues and that the provincial legislatures are tasked with oversight over this, this 
is extremely problematic. The third issue is access to documents on the substantive issues under 
discussion, this is crucial to ensure that people are prepared to engage with the issues on the 
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table. Documents on which many participation processes are based, such as bills, departmental 
reports or draft policies are generally made available in English, and as a norm, they are seldom 
available in local languages, nor are ‘plain language’ explanations of the often technical and legal 





As previously stated, the issue of the timeframes in which notification is given for public 
submissions, written or oral, is frequently cited as a significant reason for poor uptake on 
opportunities to participate.373 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) explain that 
the public cannot make meaningful inputs into processes, under circumstances in which, at times, 
less than a week’s notice is given, and Hicks and Buccus argue that this results in the exclusion of 
community based organisations and structures.374 Short notice also precludes effective 
mobilisation, consultation and deliberation among networks and in communities, limiting the 
quality of public responses.375 Even two weeks’ notice may not always be sufficient to mobilise 
resources or people around the country who are not already orgnised to respond.376 In addition to 
late notice, last minute schedule changes, cancellation and postponement of committee meetings 
and public hearings is not uncommon and confounds participation.377 At times this also results in 
organisations wasting resources.378 During the process of provincial hearings on the TCB in 
addition to extremely late notice for some hearings,379 there were instances where the venue for 
the hearing was changed and members of the public were not notified of the change, this resulted 
in people arriving at the original venue on the morning of the hearings only to discover there was 
no hearing at that venue, and as a consequence people had the option of paying for public 
transport to the new venue or not attending at all.380  
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Not only the RIPAP, but more importantly the Constitutional Court has stressed the importance of 
giving the public enough time to prepare submissions.381 However the absence of any clear 
standards as to what reasonable timeframes are, provides the gap in which the practice of 
providing last-minute notice can continue. Although Parliament in the last five years has aimed to 
provide two-weeks’ notice382 this standard is not articulated in the Rules, and certainly it is not 
the standard with regard to PLs and their processes at local level.383 
 
3.4. Methods of communication and notification 
 
In addition to notice periods and the nature of the information available to people, the 
mechanisms for public notification are generally problematic and favour organised groups in civil 
society who have access to resources.384 Currently bills are published in the Government Gazette 
and on Parliament’s website, and the legislatures rely on national print media and websites to 
communicate upcoming participation opportunities.385 COSATU argue that these mechanisms tick 
the box of legal obligations to provide information but fail to consider the ‘spirit of ensuring public 
access’.386 
 
To participate effectively in the annual oversight processes of the legislatures it’s essential to have 
access to the draft departmental annual reports and strategic plans on which deliberations are 
based. However these drafts are not made broadly available prior to being assessed by 
parliament. To access them one must physically go to the document stores at Parliament. Until 
recently these have only been available in hard copy, two weeks prior to the deliberations.387 This 
once again demonstrates the lack of attention to public participation in the oversight functions of 
the legislatures. 
 
The Centre for Public Participation states that notification must extend ‘beyond mainstream 
media and make use of community print and electronic productions.’ 388  A civil society conference 
in 2012, which examined the functioning of the legislatures took this further, calling for greater 
use of new social media, including cell-phone platforms such as mass SMS messaging and MIXit. 
The conference noted that these platforms not only tick the boxes for notifications, but allow for 
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more sustained engagement with people for input and communicating outcomes on processes.389 
In addition, there are a range of avenues for communication that target particular constituents, 
through existing local networks and structures such as school governing bodies and newsletters, 
local religious forums, community meetings, iindaba, lekgotla, and community policing forums.390  
 
3.5. Implications for who has access 
 
Research indicates that the same individuals and organisations tend to access parliament to 
participate over time.391 This pool of ‘usual suspects’ has not changed significantly and tends to be 
made up of actors from the private sector and civil society elites that are organised and have 
greater access to resources.392 Linked to this, February refers to a survey undertaken with 100 000 
NPOs in South Africa, of which the ‘extreme minority’ ever engage in parliamentary processes.393 
 
The issue, does not, however solely revolve around the preparedness of citizen groups to 
respond, the issue of who is informed of opportunities and how is also pertinent. Citizens have 
raised concerns that people who are known to be sympathetic to government’s position on an 
issue are targeted with information and at times provided with financial or practical support to 
participate.394 The lack of transparency regarding who is invited and supported by the legislatures 
to participate exacerbates this. 
 
4. Civil Society 
 
Thus far I’ve primarily discussed the performance of the legislatures in relation to public 
participation, however, some attention must be turned to the issue of the performance of the 
public and civil society in this regard. Theron et al indicate that citizens have a responsibility to 
further participation within democratic contexts and argue that the question of who ‘owns’ 
participation in South Africa has not been sufficiently engaged or answered.395  
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A central question is: how well is civil society managing to ‘invent’ spaces for interactions with 
government and the legislatures, and to what extent are the invited opportunities being claimed 
and re-framed by civil society?  
 
4.1. Creating and inventing spaces 
 
Due to the limitations to access of legislature-led opportunities, its essential for civil society to 
invest in building spaces and capacity to ensure a wider range of public contributions can be 
heard and taken note of by those with political power. This is supported by an activist’s views in 
relation to the Traditional Courts Bill particiation process:  
 
“So the lesson is that civil society engagement can change the content of laws if people 
take opportunities, but also, the offical processes are deeply one-sided. They’re 
inaccessible, and without a broader alliance that’s mustering resources to enable people 
to be able to use them effectively, the power imbalances are really almost 
insurmountable.”396 
 
Building strategic alliances and mobilisation within civil society is considered central to the notion 
of creating such spaces and is linked to increased political influence of civil society groups.397 The 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) stands out as one of the most significant alliances.398 TAC’s 
approaches of building alliance and ‘moral consensus’ among civil society to strengthen its work 
involving direct engagement with policy makers has been argued by analysts to be central to the 
successes of the campaign.399 More recently the Right to Know Campaign (R2K), originally 
established in 2010 to build civil society’s response to the Protection of State Information Bill 
(PoSIB)400 has subsequently broadened its support base to include a range of civil society 
structures ranging from well resourced NGOs to locally based organisations and social 
movements.401 There are numerous other examples of alliances formed for this purpose including 
the Alliance for Rural Democracy (ARD) established in 2012 to respond to the TCB; the civil society 
coalition responding to the Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality bill (WEGEB); and the 
Shukumisa campaign which focuses on the implementation of sexual offences legislation and 
policy. A key feature of these alliances is their attempts to broaden their membership beyond 
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individuals and organisations who typically engage in policy formulation and who are resourced, 
to include individuals and citizen groups operating in local contexts.  
 
These alliances tend to invest in range of actions besides building their support bases. These 
include providing the public and their members with information regarding the policy issues 
under debate; providing information on the opportunities for participation;402 providing regular 
updates on developments in the process;403 providing deliberative spaces for civil society to build 
understanding of and responses to the issues; creating participation spaces, particularly through 
organising marches or other public actions; engaging directly with political leaders in formal 
interactions such as meetings or hearings – often focussing on ensuring that those people who 
are less frequently present in those spaces can participate in these too; attending parliamentary 
committee meetings to monitor the proceedings;404 and sustained media engagement in order to 
influence public discourse on the issues.  
 
Public protest is also considered a significant form of created citizen engagement with the state, 
often linked to citizens’ frustrations regarding their lack of influence over state decisions.405 
Theron et al argue that protest is the dominant form of public participation in South Africa.406  
Karamoko and Jain have analysed the extent of community level protests in South Africa since 
2007 indicating that these were at their height in the first quarter of 2010, at 18 protests per 
month and have subsequently dropped down to levels similar to those seen in 2007 at just under 
nine protests per month.407 
 
Another avenue some organisations employ is to invite MPs and MPLs to forums for discussion on 
key issues. The response of elected representatives to these varies, but is generally not 
overwhelmingly positive.408 That said, there are a handful of members of legislatures who do 
respond positively to these and engage with citizens in spaces, on issues and on the terms set by 
citizens.409 The extent to which this influences decisions taken in government spaces is difficult to 
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assess. However by engaging in these, elected representatives are exposed directly to various 
stakeholders representing different parts of ‘civil society’ and citizens experiences, they are 
exposed to new information and research, and relationships and good faith can be built between 
parties. 
 
4.2. Laying claim to the legislatures 
 
The methods by which existing invited spaces are claimed is perhaps less politically exiting than 
the concept of inventing spaces, at the same time, it presents a range of useful means by which 
people can increase access to and influence in the legislatures. Civil society can utilise existing 
structures, processes and entry points into the legislatures for this purpose. Due to the provisions 
for access and openness of the legislatures, there is nothing to preclude citizens from attending 
meetings and monitoring discussions. It is frequently possible to engage with MPs and MPLs 
informally in these meetings during breaks or through providing members with written 
information relating to the issues during deliberations.410 In addition, many organisations have 
invested in building their relationships with committee support people such as committee 
secretaries and researchers in order to obtain up to date information regarding processes and 
timeframes, and in order to provide unsolicited information to committees indirectly through 
these people.411  
 
The failure of the legislatures to invite civil society to provide inputs on their oversight of 
departments has not prevented civil society from inviting itself to the table.412 Some organisations 
have been organised and robust in engaging with these processes, reminding committees of their 
duty to undertake oversight at times and providing the committees with submissions on the issue, 
in spite of not being invited to do so.413 Responses of committees to this input has been mixed, 
van der Westhuizen refers to an instance in which the chairperson of the Justice committee 
recognised the valuable contribution of organisations in the Shukumisa Campaign in compiling a 
report on the implementation of the Sexual Offences Act, as a result of this report the committee 
                                                        
410 This methodology is a common component of engagement strategies and frequently associated with Lobbying. The 
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groups can engage with MPs and MPLs using the existing structures, processes, and entry points in the legislatures. This 
has included a focus on increasing civil society participation in the oversight functions of the legislatures. Author’s 
experience. 
413 Ben-Zeev and Waterhouse. 2012. Ibid. P19. The Shukumisa Campaign has also been successful in requesting 
opportunities from the Justice and Social Development Committees on numerous occasions between 2010 and 2015 to 
provide research and information to these committees regarding the implementation of policy and law. Author’s 
records. 
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took a very critical position regarding the department’s weak performance in that regard.414 
Furthermore, the BRRRs and meeting reports of the Justice committee between 2009 and 2014 
demonstrate a growing awareness in that committee of the issues affecting the implementation 
of sexual offences legislation.415 
 
On the other hand, attempts to lay claim to the legislatures’ spaces is not always well received. In 
the October 2014 round of oversight over departmental annual performance, civil society 
organisations indicate that out of four committees approached with the request to provide input, 
only the Justice committee immediately agreed, obtaining the go-ahead from the Health and 
Social Development portfolio committees required much more of a two and fro between the 
organisations concerned and the committees, before those committees relented.416 One 
organisation indicated that based on the resistance from the committee to their request that they 
decided it was not worth the investment as they had other issues on which to spend their time.417 
The reluctance of these committees to allow these submissions was viewed by the organisations 
involved, as an indication of a renewed resistance to critical input relating to government 
performance by the relatively new 5th Parliament, subsequent to the 2014 general elections.418 
Those organisations that participated reflected after making submissions, that this had not had 
significant impact, while organisations perceived the response of the Justice and Social 
Development committees to the submissions to be polite yet patronising, those who presented in 
the Health committee reported that the ANC committee members were downright hostile.419 
Backlash by the legislatures to citizens attempting to claim the Parliamentary space are evident 
during the deliberations on the Protection of State Information Bill, where parliament threatened 
to apply ‘the full might of the law’ to members of the Right to Know Campaign who silenty 
protested for one minute during the meeting.420 In another example, in January 2014, members of 
the Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Taskforce were told to leave a public hearing on the 
Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality bill for staging a silent protest against the bill.421  
 
While initiatives of the legislatures are criticised for being conceptualised as once-off 
engagements, civil society also often fails to take advantage of opportunities to sustain their 
engagement. A study on public participation in the legislatures found that organised participation 
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416 The author corresponded formally with the Justice, Health and Social Development committees in this regard.  
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protest-during-wege-parliamentary-mee 
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was seldom sustained beyond attending public hearings.422 While the formal opportunity to 
present to a committee is limited to hearings, in the time thereafter, the meetings are open to the 
public and deliberations can be monitored, further, many committees are open to receiving 
follow up written submissions on the issues under discussion, and as mentioned previously 
organisations can utilise the breaks during the meeting to engage MPs individually and informally.  
 
In spite of these examples of civil society seeking to lay greater claim to the legislatures, they 
represent the actions of a very limited section of civil society. On the whole civil society has not 
significantly implemented mechanisms to increase their participation in the legislatures beyond 
those opportunities where they are called on to make submissions.423  
 
4.3. Power, inequality and exclusion within civil society.  
 
There is evidence of some organisations in South African civil society ‘speaking on behalf of 
marginalised groups’, doing so in the absence of consultation or a mandate and doing so without 
providing feedback or being accountable to those groups.424 The growing presence of alliances 
and networks such as the R2K and the ARD, and the fact that many of these make a concerted 
effort to ensure a wide range of organisations participate, is positive in this regard, however it 
heightens the importance of examining how power plays out within civil society. Friedman and 
McKeiser state that ‘civil society remains highly uneven terrain, in which who has resources and 
connections largely determines influence.’425 As a consequence, community based groups and 
members of the public in more marginalised positions in society do not trust these larger 
networks and NGOs.426 This imbalance within CSOs can only be addressed through greater 
investment into building strong community-based structures.427 The ARD sought through its 
processes and structures to mitigate against this tendency for elite, resourced or academic 
organisations to control the voice and identity of the alliance.428 Similarly the Right to Know 
Campaign has demonstrated a commitment to the principle of accountability and openness, not 
only in respect of the state but regarding practices within the campaign itself.429 That said, it will 
be impossible to get away from the fact that founding, or stronger organisations in any alliance 
are likely to have more power than others.  
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By their nature, alliances are formed around a common position, and reasonably exclude those 
who don’t subscribe to that position.430 However it’s critical that the methods by which members 
of an alliance participate in developing the central positions of that alliance and the extent to 
which members can influence the strategy of the alliance, ensure that elite organisations do not 
co-opt and assimilate the other organisations involved in the alliance. The insidious ways in which 
power within civil society can manifest, requires the same level of scrutiny within as is levelled by 
many of these alliances at the state. 
 
 
5. The power games within invited participation processes  
 
Researchers and analysts strongly argue that the legislatures’ public engagement initiatives are 
formal box-checking exercises designed to meet constitutional requirements, but that they are 
implemented in ways that seek to validate predetermined political positions and agendas, with 
little possibility of them influencing the outcomes.431  
 
Although the formal discussion on issues takes place in committees, many decisions, particularly 
those relating to more politically charged issues, are actually taken in political party caucuses and 
are significantly influenced by part positions and senior party members who are not members of 
the committees.432 Hicks and Buccus explain that the fundamental problem with participation 
exercises is their failure to enable engagement of the public in the sites of power where decisions 
are actually taken.433 Civil society’s efforts to influence the decisions of the legislatures are 
currently dominated by academic and technical approaches, aimed at providing committees with 
sound information on which to base their decisions, as such they fail to reach all of the people, 
particularly more senior party members, who are involved in making the decision.434 While this 
may not be problematic when commenting on issues that are not significantly contested, it is a 
significant barrier to influence in highly politically charged processes. To increase the potential for 
influence, civil society must also develop strategies to reach a wider political and public audience, 
such as accessing and interacting with members of party caucuses, utilising contestation within 
political parties, building strategic alliances, and engaging in public discourse to add political 
weight to their positions.435  
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The value of taking this more politically contextualised approach, is evident in the outcomes or 
status of a number of laws, policies and bills in which there has been significant contestation 
between civil society alliances and the ANC party position, the successes of the TAC is perhaps 
chief amongst these. Other examples include the Equal Education Campaign, which undertook 
activities both within the committees of Parliament as well as through picketing and 
demonstrations outside Parliament regarding the dismal conditions of schools in the Eastern 
Cape. Their actions directed at Parliament, are attributed to the resultant action taken by the 
Basic Education committee to influence the Minister of Basic Education to invoke section 
100(1)(b) of the Constitution, which enables a national department to assume responsibility for a 
provincial obligation.436 Although as yet not finalised, and in spite of tremendous resistance from 
ANC MPs and leaders, the PoSIB provides another example of civil society action affecting highly 
charged political issues.437 Although Friedman disagrees with the approach of R2K, and stresses 
that the current formulation of the bill still poses a threat to democracy, he points out that many 
of the demands made by the campaign were addressed in amendments by the committee, 
arguing that this demonstrates that Parliament does sometimes heed such campaigns.438 The fact 
that the PoSIB has not yet been passed demonstrates that the contestation over its provisions is 
having some impact. This is also true of the TCB and WEGEB, both of which senior government 
leaders indicated an intention to pass into law prior to the 2014 general election.439 Although in 
both of these cases there is as yet no formal indication on if any amendments will be made and if 
so what these will be, and in fact if and when they will be reintroduced into Parliament; the fact 
that their processes were stalled belies the influence of alliances, which in both cases 
demonstrated almost unanimous rejection of the bills in the form that they were tabled. A 
common feature of the PoSIB and the TCB is not only the extent of civil society mobilisation, but 
also indications of divisions within the ANC regarding their content, which is also likely to lie 
behind the delays in finalising these bills in the form originally tabled.440 
 
However these gains are not achieved without conflict that plays out between MPs or MPLs and 
members of the public in the parliamentary committees and public hearings.441 The formal rules 
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may be manipulated explicitly or in more subtle ways to favour some speakers and some 
positions. Defining the rules of engagement lies firmly with MPs and MPLs, the public has no input 
into how processes will be conducted. The Chairperson has the power to decide who can speak, 
for how long they can speak, on what issues they may speak, if interruptions will be allowed or 
not, and whether the committee can engage in questions with that person. This is illustrated by 
the comments of an activist who was involved in mobilisation regarding the controversial TCB 
since 2008: 
 
“There was no discussion of the controversial aspects of the bill...People were told that 
they had to comment on specific provisions of the bill. ... those conducting the hearings 
tried to shut people down when they spoke about their general experiences and how the 
bill would exacerbate these situations... . ... when one of our researchers tried to highlight 
problems with the appeals section, she was overruled - the chair just picked up the 
microphone and started speaking over her...At the hearings the chiefs were introduced 
individually... There was a great show of deference towards them... they were allowed to 
speak for as long as they liked, they weren’t subject to the same time limits as others; at 
other hearings they were invited to make the closing comments.”442 
 
In another example, in October 2014, both the Justice and the Social Development portfolio 
committees indicated that the committees would not engage civil society presenters in questions 
or discussion, citing time constraints as the reason for this decision.443 These decisions effectively 
rendered the already limited deliberative potential of those meetings to nil. Leaving CSOs present, 
with the impression that their analysis and suggestions regarding departmental performance and 
spending were of no interest to the committee’s decision-making.444  
 
As illustrated in the quote regarding the TCB process above, chairpersons may also favour people 
in the meeting who are uncritical of the ruling party or departmental positions, at times this 
means allowing people, such as traditional leaders in the case of the TCB, and Ministers and 
Directors General of departments, who hold significant social or political power to go beyond 
asking questions of clarity to interrupt and antagonistically challenge civil society presenters in 
hearings.445 Displays of hostility and antagonism by committee members towards civil society 
have not been uncommon over the years and various examples are cited. This includes hostile 
treatment of civil society activists during struggles to increase access to anti-retroviral medicines 
by from the Health committee;446 the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative reports that committee 
                                                        
442 Smythe D, People’s Power People’s Parliament conference, 14 August 2012, Cape Town. Quote taken from 
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443 Madonko and Waterhouse. 2014. Ibid. 
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members have at times made verbal attacks on presenters from civil society at different 
committee meetings;447 and a number of civil society activists from NGOs and community-based 
structures who participated in national and provincial hearings on the TCB, who report being 
intimidated by committee members while attempting to make their submissions.448 As a final 
example, towards the end of 2014 four organisations were informed by the chairperson of the 
Health committee that they were ‘lucky’ that she did not have them thrown out of the meeting.449 
This was in response to a range of inputs from these organisations regarding the department’s 
performance,450 her claims that they did not understand the nature of the process of reviewing 
the annual reports and developing budget recommendations also belies her own lack of 
understanding of the process as defined by the SOM.451 Hicks and Buccus argue that in addition to 
manipulating the rules of engagement and taking a threatening stance to critical input, there are 
‘tendencies of the leading party…to close ranks’ against opposition or critique, ‘labelling dissenters 
… as ultra left, politically ambitious or even in some cases racist.’452 
 
A prime example of a committee seeking to skew deliberations (and the record of the process) 
away from critical public input, is the incident in which the chairperson of the Select Committee 
on Security and Justice instructed the department to only summarise two of the 31 oral 
submissions that were made (not to mention the further 36 written submissions received) for 
further discussion by the committee.453 Although less politically charged than the example of the 
TCB, another illustration of Parliament’s lack of regard for public input, in spite of rhetoric to the 
contrary, relates to recent amendments to the Rules of the National Assembly. There is no 
obligation for the legislatures to consult with the public on the development of their rules. 
However, late in 2012, the National Assembly called for public input into the 7th edition of the 
Rules.454  Six submissions are recorded by the PMG.455 Subsequent to making submissions these 
organisations were not provided with feedback regarding the process, nor were they informed of 
the dates on which the Committee deliberated on the Rules, and nor was there any feedback on 
the extent to which submissions were taken into account.456 Upon searching Parliament’s website 
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mid 2014, it became clear that the rules had been amended. A review of the record of the 
meetings relating to this shows that in their first meeting to discuss the public input the 
Committee are deeply concerned at the minimal response from the public to the call for 
comment. They state that this demonstrates a ‘lack of interest’ from the public in the process, the 
Committee then discussed at length the particular importance and failure of political parties to 
prepare submissions to inform the process; they make no reference in this meeting to the actual 
content of the submissions received.457 Reading through the records of the clause-by-clause 
deliberations on the rules in the latter part of 2013, there is no evidence of members of the 
Committee referring to any of the submissions that they received throughout their lengthy 
deliberations on the amendments.458 Similarly a reading of the most recent version of the rules in 
conjunction with the submissions indicates that none of the recommendations made in 
submissions were incorporated into the rules. 
 
The absence of any rules or standards regarding how submissions should be considered facilitates 
the scenarios described in the above examples.459 In 2006, February argued that committees 
required rules to assist in defining how to weight different submissions and to ensure systematic 
processes of review of submissions so that ‘valid or reasonable’ recommendations would be 
considered in the committee deliberations.460 That said, it is questionable if rules of this nature 
will fully resolve the problems, when often, the reason behind not taking submissions into 
account is politically motivated. The events in the NA in the latter part of 2014 and early in 2015 
demonstrate that on politically charged issues, it is not the purely the absence of the rules, but 
also the decisions of the ruling party about how and when to enforce existing rules that comes 
into play.461 
 
The failures of the legislatures to provide feedback on the processes and their outcomes to 
members of the public, have been widely noted as a significant problem and gap in the formal 
systems and procedures of the institutions.462 The consequence of this is increased public 
disillusionment and mistrust in these processes.463 It’s not simply a matter of good manners, but 
rather one of the accountability of legislatures to the public regarding their decision-making 
processes. Thus standards do need to be developed for feedback, and this feedback should not 
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only include what was decided, but also provide the reasons for the decisions as well as the 
reasons for rejecting certain recommendations.464  
 
Formal mechanisms and systems, even if they are implemented at a high standard, are not going 
to automatically result in citizen influence. Thus a greater awareness in civil society of the reality 
that many decisions are taken outside of committee-level deliberations, and are not only 
influenced by sound research or solid legal arguments but more significantly by the prevailing 
political will on the issue, could lead to the conceptualisation of broader civil society strategies for 
political influence.  It must be bourn in mind, however, that the power to define the rules of 
engagement, to silence, or amplify certain positions on invited opportunities lies with the 
legislatures and as such, it will always be necessary to monitor these processes and challenge 




Given the South Africa’s political system and context, the allegiance of most MPs and MPLs tends 
to lie first with their political party and not the public, this has serious implications for the 
independence of legislatures as well as their responsiveness to public inputs, particularly where 
these are at odds with the prevailing political position on an issue. The framework and technical 
avenues for public participation fail to mitigate against the politics of power that maintain 
exclusion and limit the influence of the public. This is particularly pronounced where the public 
view, even when it is a widely held view, is at odds predetermined political agendas. 
 
In South Africa’s representative democracy, public participation is imposed on elected 
representatives due to the constitutional framework and is undertaken more to meet these 
obligations than as a result of a firm commitment to the value of on-going public interaction with 
elected representatives. Theron et al have argued that government officials have failed to 
properly grasp the concept of on-going political participation and thus persist in implementing 
ineffective methods, they go on to suggest that the absence of programmes to orient officials to 
the principles and values that enable ‘planning with’ the people means that many are oblivious to 
their dismal performance in this regard.465 This critique applies equally to elected representatives; 
however, orientation to the principles alone is unlikely to be sufficient, institutional commitment 
from the senior level would be essential to ensure these shifts in practice. 
 
There is wide scope for public engagement with legislatures, and these are most developed in 
respect of law reform processes. In addition, in the past five years, the legislatures have 
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demonstrated greater awareness of, and attempts to fulfil their oversight functions, which is 
evident in the development of laws and models to provide scaffolding to these functions, and 
notwithstanding that attempts at calling members of the executive to account, have been fraught 
with backlash from senior party structures and an apparent lack of mettle of many MPs to assert 
themselves over the executive. Yet public participation on oversight is relatively underdeveloped, 
both in terms of implementation of measures for this by the legislatures and in terms of civil 
society’s tendency to await invitation to participate in these opportunities, linked to a lack of 
proactive engagement with the legislatures on state performance. The increasing attention of the 
legislatures to implement mechanisms that take participation opportunities to local communities 
is promising, however they too remain fraught with challenges, and across the board, public 
access to information remains a serious barrier for effective participation, which is at its worst in 
the provincial legislatures and with regard to the oversight activities of the legislatures. 
 
The primary responsibility to facilitate public participation lies with the state, however this does 
not absolve civil society of responsibility in this regard. The predominance of better-resourced 
CSOs in engagements with the legislatures must not only be addressed by the legislatures, but 
also with civil society. Increasing the potential for influence means strengthening the legitimacy of 
civil society structures through broadening support bases and alliances between NGOs and 
community-based structures and addressing some of the factors that cement the exclusion of 
certain groups. At the same time civil society organisations and alliances must be critical of the 
potential for abuse of power within their own structures, and implement measures to recognise 
and mitigate against this. Critically, advocacy strategies must include analysis of the site of 
political decision-making and how best to gain direct or indirect access to those spaces through 
mobilisation, leveraging points of contention within political parties, and influencing the public 
discourse through the mass media. Finally organisations can take a more robust approach to 
laying claim to avenues offered by the legislatures for engagement on an on-going basis. 
 
Addressing gaps in the rules and systems for participation can go some way to improving the 
performance of legislatures in this regard, however the legislatures are primarily political spaces, 
battles over contested issues will not be won by stronger frameworks alone. It’s naïve not to 
recognise that whoever holds power in any space can use that power, and generally will, to 
subvert opposition; either through more subtle manipulation of processes and rules in service of 
that agenda or through more obvious bullying tactics. However civil society must continue to 
challenge these abuses of the system and to defend the constitutionally intended purpose of the 










There is a general consensus that South Africa’s legislatures have delivered poorly in asserting 
their independence over the executive, performing oversight and facilitating public involvement. 
However, it is an oversimplification to suggest that the performance of the legislatures over the 
past 20 years has only been dismal. Reading van der Westhuizen’s assessment of the legislatures 
since 1994, it is clear that the quality of their performance has differed at different times.466 The 
nature of the relationships between elected representatives and members of the executive has 
not been static. There is evidence of numerous incidences in which MPs have put pressure on 
government duty bearers. That said, there is also evidence that they have ultimately paid the 
price for this, which has led to suggestions that South Africa’s fifth parliament is even less likely to 
exercise its muscle than those in previous terms. The veracity of these claims remains to be 
seen.467 Nor have the legislatures been completely impervious to public input. Delegates at the 
civil society conference on South Africa’s Legislatures in 2012 indicated that ‘citizens could still 
have an influence in decision-making. In spite of the frustrations, participation is not always 
without impact’.468 Again this must be qualified, as this impact may at times be reliant on broader 
mobilisation strategies rather than direct engagement with the legislatures alone.  
 
For the most part, opportunities for citizen participation in the legislatures are ‘inadequate, 
inaccessible and disempowering’.469 In spite of the legal framework, the purpose, methods and 
processes used means that participation seldom allow for the potential of public influence.470 
Similar to the findings in other jurisdictions,471 on-going political participation in South Africa’s 
legislatures seems to be motivated by the legal framework and not by the values that underpin 
this framework.472 As such, it is implemented as an afterthought to the more resilient 
representative system.  
 
Measuring South Africa against its IHRL and Constitutional obligations 
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Generally speaking the South African framework for political participation meets the IHRL 
standards in terms of requirements for participation through elections and in terms of provisions 
for on-going participation in the development and implementation of policy.473 However, the 
performance of the state relative to the elaboration of those standards by the UNSREPHR, in her 
report on the participation of people living in poverty, is weaker. Carmona’s report sets out a 
number of recommendations to states. 474 I have dealt with these extensively in Chapter 3, but it is 
worth recapping here. States are required to develop a legal framework for participation at local 
and national levels. South Africa has this in place and has met the requirement to develop policies 
and operational guidelines, primarily through the Rules of the legislatures, the SOM and the PPF; 
however, the Rules are limited and the more comprehensive SOM and PPF are not enforceable. 
Thus the extent to which they are implemented remains to be seen. The report’s 
recommendations also recognise the strong links between the right to participate and the rights 
to freedom of association, freedom of the media, access to information and protection for whistle 
blowers. While these are largely in place, the PoSIB475 poses a significant threat.476 And, although 
the South African framework meets the basic requirements of the right to receive information, 
the lack of articulation of what information and how to make that available, contributes to the 
dismal performance of the legislatures in this regard. The Money Bills Act477 provides some legal 
framework for the participation of the public in budget formulation, but its implementation thus 
far is not promising, both in terms of the capacity of elected representatives to fulfil their role and 
in terms of public participation.  
 
The constitutional requirements for the openness and accessibility of South Africa’s legislatures 
are progressive in the global context and there can be no question that, under a basic analysis, 
the legislatures are meeting those requirements. Members of the public who can physically get to 
the legislatures are able to attend committee meetings and follow the discussions in these fora. 
The value of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (a non-partisan CSO)478 to the public, is based 
on the fact that the organisation’s monitors have access to the committee meetings in 
Parliament, and are able to record proceedings. Thus, although Parliament’s website is limited, 
members of the public who cannot physically attend Parliament, but have access to the Internet, 
are able to reasonably follow the agenda as well as the content of discussions in committees. 
Although technically accessible, in that people who can get there may enter, the legislatures are 
generally inaccessible to most, due not only to geographic limitations, but also to failures of the 
legislatures to widely disseminate information regarding their purpose, their programmes and the 
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issues under discussion, to the public. For this reason the PLs, although closer to most, are less 
accessible than Parliament is. Finally the reality that most political decisions are taken by political 
parties in closed spaces means that the openness of and access to legislatures does not translate 
into openness and access to the sites of decision-making.  
 
Clearly, in spite of the limitations, the systems and practice for meeting the constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public involvement in the legislative functions of their work have been well 
developed over the past 20 years, and well utilised by some sectors of civil society. Further, the 
legislatures’ practice of hosting public hearings on bills, in towns and cities across the country has 
been strengthened. However this is not the case in respect of the ‘other’ functions of the 
legislatures: in spite of the more recently developed Money Bills Act and the SOM, the extent and 
quality of opportunities as well as civil society’s utilisation of these are pitiful.  
 
As discussed in Chapter two, researchers have argued that the use of the term ‘involvement’ in 
the Constitution is ambiguous and results in a lack of clarity of the legislatures on what is 
required, providing an avenue to implement weaker forms of engagement that are tokenistic. 479 
However, the Constitutional Court has provided clarity regarding the interpretation of the term 
public involvement, stating that it must be understood as ‘participation’. 480 This clarity from the 
court has not demonstrably resulted in a shift in the nature of participation undertaken by the 
legislatures. 
 
The reasonableness test established by the Constitutional Court requires the legislatures to 
consider the nature and importance of the legislation, linked to the intensity of its impact on the 
public, and allows that the practical considerations of law making processes must also be taken 
into account.481 Establishing the extent to which the legislatures measure up to this test can only 
be assessed in relation to the development of particular pieces of legislation and the 
accompanying participation processes. It is notable that in the processes relating to both the TCB 
and the WEGEB, public inputs were overwhelmingly consistent in arguments that these pieces of 
legislation would impact significantly on the lives of the majority of South Africans and that the 
state had failed to adequately consult with the people most affected, namely rural South Africans 
and women respectively.482 Thus, regarding these two pieces of legislation, civil society has 
indicated that the participation processes implemented by the executive and the legislatures have 
not matched the level of intensity and impact of the issues on the public. Although not required 
by the judgement, it would be interesting to analyse the performance of the legislatures in 
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respect of facilitating public involvement in their oversight functions against this reasonableness 
test. In spite of the dismal performance in this regard, delivery on socio-economic as well as civil 
and political rights has tremendous impact on the public.  
 
Meeting the standards of deliberative democracy, and ‘meaningful’ or rights-based 
participation 
 
The developing theory and practice for deliberative democratic processes give greater direction to 
rights-based participation. As reflected in Chapter three, the evidence suggests that not only does 
this improve the rational outcomes of such processes but it also increases the possibility of 
building equity between and empowering participants. The participation implemented by the 
legislatures provides the opportunity for people to offer their opinions and to some extent, within 
time constraints,483 to provide the reasoning behind these.484 However, these meetings don’t 
provide an opportunity for any discussion, let alone robust discussion between members of the 
public and committee members. In many hearings, but not all of them,485 a short amount of time 
is allocated for questions and answers between committee members and the presenter. Nor does 
the format of question and answer interactions meet the standards of deliberative process.486 
Entrenched practices and values regarding public engagement with the legislatures is in all 
likelihood a greater barrier to effective deliberation and debate between elected representatives 
and the public than the limited time available.  
 
There is evidence of civil society organisations implementing deliberative processes in their 
preparations for engagements on law reform, this is done through hosting workshops with a 
range of stakeholders prior to hearings on an issue, in order to debate the bill, identify and 
develop understanding on points of contention, and build consensus where possible.487 However, 
these civil society-led deliberative fora, while allowing for deliberation within civil society, do not 
create deliberation between the public and elected representatives.  
                                                        
483 February. 2006. Ibid. P136.  
484 In Parliament presenters usually have between 10 and 20 mutues to make their oral submissions to committees. 
However in the case of the TCB there were examples where the public in some of the provincial hearings were limited 
to two to three minutes. While written submissions provide space for reasoning the extent to which committee 
members read these in detail is unclear. The examples of the processes of the amendments to parliament’s rules, 
where the written submissions were not discussed as well as the TCB where only oral submissions were referred to in 
the debacle regarding the summarising of submissions is an indication that written submissions do not have broad 
impact on committees.  
485 In October 2014, both the Justice and the Social Development committees indicated that they did not have sufficient 
time to engage in questions (let alone discussion) with civil society presenters. Author’s experience. 
486 It’s notable that in the NA deliberations on the TCB in 2008 and in the NA deliberations on the Child Justice Bill in 
2008 the committee chair invited representative organisations from civil society to participate in the discussions of the 
committee on those bills. In both cases this was representation was undertaken by academic experts –‘elites’ – who 
were able to engage in the discussions with the committee members on the bill in the meetings following the hearings. 
487 The ARD hosted public education workshops across the country during 2012, these were designed to encourage 
debate among participants; in December 2013, four organisations hosted a civil society workshop to debate the 
implications of the WEGE bill and in January 2015, two organisations hosted a similar workshop on the Criminal Law 
[Sexual Offences and Related Matters] Amendment Act Amendment Bill [B18 of 2014] 
 71 
 
I have argued that to be rights-based, the processes must be recognised as a right. They must 
have the potential to influence the outcomes, and they must explicitly recognise power and offer 
the possibility of transforming power relationships and inequality. Further than the requirements 
for public participation in the legal frameworks, participation in South Africa’s legislatures fails to 
reach the standards described in the theoretical framework for a rights-based approach to or 
‘meaningful’ participation. Theories of participation provide a number of indicators for what these 
concepts mean. The discussion in Chapter four indicates the extent to which these standards are 
being met. Firstly, as a norm, participation in the legislatures is implemented as once off events,488 
and while the legislatures fail to conceptualise them as processes of engagement with the public, 
too frequently, civil society organisations do likewise, failing to make effective use of the 
obligation on legislatures to conduct their business openly and to ensure on-going interaction 
with committees on issues as they are debated. Secondly, people affected by the issue should 
have the opportunity to influence the agenda for discussion, as well as the terms on which 
discussion takes place, but there is no evidence of this being incorporated into the approaches of 
the legislatures. Not only are people not involved in the planning phases, the TCB process 
provides an example of the legislatures holding firm to their terms of engagement, in which 
people were repeatedly required to confine their inputs to specific sections of the bill. Attempts 
to describe how they are affected by traditional leaders and how the bill exacerbated 
vulnerabilities, were silenced in many of the provincial and national hearings.489 I’ve touched on 
the failure to implement the principle that those most affected must be actively involved in the 
process in terms of the performance regarding the TCB and WEGE bills above. In addition, the fact 
that research continues to show that the people who access these processes are those with 
greater resources490 is a further indicator of the failure of the legislatures to meet this 
requirement. Linked to the concept that participation must be implemented as a process are 
requirements for feedback to the public, however the legislatures’ own record of their meetings 
and decisions is poor, and feedback on processes to the public is non-existent.491  
 
The legislatures have failed to demonstrate the political will to implement citizen participation 
within an ideological framework that can result in citizens having influence on the outcomes.492 
Shifting the current culture would require leadership from senior members in the legislatures and 
in political parties. In addition, it requires the implementation of programmes for elected 
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members and staff of the legislatures that go beyond describing the basic requirements and 
systems for participation, to embed the values and principles of rights-based participation.493  
 
As discussed in chapter three, within a rights-based approach, participation should challenge 
oppression, enable the transformation of power relations, and facilitate redistribution of 
resources.494 However, the framework and technical avenues for public participation that are in 
place, generally fail to even recognise the existence of power, be it the power of the state to 
control the sites and terms of engagement or the hierarchies of power that exist in society, and 
may play out in or be exacerbated by participation processes. Rather, in chapter four I discuss 
numerous examples in which MPs abuse their power in attempts to silence dissenting voices and 
control the outcomes. In addition, there’s no evidence that the relative power between different 
groups of the public – such as between men and women, professionals and non-professionals, or 
adults and children – is considered in the design of processes. To address this requires 
incorporating mechanisms that allow for people with relatively lower social power to speak freely 
without fear of reprisal subsequent to the event. It may mean creating spaces from which some 
groups are excluded in order to facilitate a frank exchange among those who experience higher 
levels of marginalisation. It is a serious indictment on the legislatures that through the processing 
of the TCB not only were these measures not in place, but MPs and MPLs used the processes to 
entrench the deep inequalities of power that exist in rural communities by underscoring the 
greater value they placed on traditional leaders than on the citizens living in those areas.  
 
Spaces for participation 
 
By definition, the opportunities for participation led by the legislatures are invited and clearly 
there is significant scope to improve their quality, however as shown in chapter three, it is the 
nature of these spaces to largely serve the interests of those who control them and thus the 
extent to which they will shift is limited. I have argued that other methods by which elected 
representatives can increase their engagements with and responsiveness to citizens are through 
interacting with the public in spaces defined by the public. This includes attending events hosted 
by NGOs, but more importantly extends to attending and participating in forums and structures 
that are embedded at local level and that are not ‘owned’ by organs of the state, including local 
saving societies (‘stokvels’), youth associations and religious groups.495 Efforts at this level, would 
not only signal the intent of MPs and MPLs to take seriously their role to interact with and be 
responsive to citizens, it would also enable the public to interact with elected representatives on 
terms and in circumstances over which they have more control. 
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The range of examples of strong alliances established to influence the legislatures, some of which 
are described in chapter four, indicates that civil society are alive to the necessity of ‘inventing’ 
processes with which to increase the potential for influence over decisions taken through the 
legislatures. However the extent to which inequality within civil society is addressed through 




Under the current closed list proportional representation electoral system, there is no motivation 
for elected representatives to be responsive and accountable to the public and, by extension, no 
motivation to implement participation over which the public may have some control.496 As early 
as 2003, the Report of the Electoral Task Team recognised this gap in motivation for political 
accountability, and the majority recommendations called for electoral reform. They proposed a 
mixed system which maintains the benefits of the proportional representation system, but allows 
for greater direct representation through the public voting for specific candidates and not only 
political parties.497 That report also suggested that in the long term, transition from ‘closed list’ 
systems where parties select candidates to an open list system in which voters influence who the 
candidates are, would benefit participation, responsiveness and accountability. This was echoed 
in the Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament in 2009.498 To date, the 
proposed debate on South Africa’s electoral system has not taken place, although prioritising it 
has been the subject of civil society pressure in recent years.499 As is noted in the reports, 
changing the system alone will not be sufficient to ensure accountability to the public. However it 
can go some way to improving on the current situation, in which there is almost no relationship 
between the public and elected representatives, and representatives continue to display a callous 
disregard of public interests on certain critical issues. 
 
No political system will escape the reality that power is deeply embedded in politics, and that 
those who hold political power will use it to further their agendas,500 and it is impossible to 
imagine that any changes in state practice alone will be sufficient to address the manifestations of 
state power in decision making. It is not the absence of contestation or power struggles, but 
rather its presence and the quality of that contestation between political parties and between 
civil society and the state that matters. It will therefore always be necessary to invest in building 
civil society, and that investment must be made by civil society on its own terms. Strong civil 
society is essential to a strong democracy, so, to strengthen public influence; the role of civil 
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society to conscientise, organise and promote plurality of voices in its efforts cannot be 
underestimated.501 Strategies must be alive to addressing power that promotes exclusion within 
civil society. Fragmentation in civil society, often driven by mistrust between NGO ‘elites’ and 
social-movement based initiatives, undermines the political weight that is needed to 
counterbalance the will of the state and private interests.502 Models of mobilisation along the 
lines used by the TAC, the Right to Know Campaign, the Alliance for Rural Democracy and Equal 
Education, which seek to build bridges between different groups of citizens, to build a broad 
support base for specific issues and to bring different strategies to campaigns require a particular 
value system, approach and investment. 
 
At this stage, all technical or political measures to strengthen the legislatures are crucial. Key, are 
initiatives for systematic and on-going scrutiny of their performance, and bringing this to the 
public’s attention. However, there seems to be a lack of significant interest by citizen groups in 
holding the legislatures to account.503 The primary space in which analysis of their performance 
takes place is through media channels,504 this critical analysis is undertaken by only a small 
handful of people. The gradual strengthening of opposition parties, particularly since the 2014 
general election, both in numbers and in the approach of opposition, has seen greater 
contestation among parties within the legislatures. This has in turn increased public attention on 
them and hopefully bodes well for on-going scrutiny of the legislatures by civil society in the years 
to come. 
 
In this paper I have been sought to assess the performance of the legislatures regarding the IHRL 
and Constitutional requirements on them to facilitate public participation, and the extent to 
which these meet the standards for rights-based participation. I approached this through using 
the legal and policy frameworks as well as the standards set in theory and practice to evaluate the 
legislatures’ performance. I have based this on expert analysis, empirical research and a range of 
examples of public participation in the legislatures drawn from over the past ten years or so. The 
initiatives meet the standards articulated in IHRL treaties, but fail to stand up to the 
recommendations of the UNSREPHR, and while meeting the basic constitutional requirements for 
public involvement in law reform, they don’t in my opinion do so with regard to the legislatures’ 
other functions.  
 
Overall the participation initiatives of the legislatures fail to promote the ‘spirit of democratic and 
pluralistic accommodation’505 as articulated by the Constitutional Court, nor are participation 
initiatives implemented ‘in accordance with the principles of accountability, responsiveness and 
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openness’,506 thus the claim that Parliament is a ‘people’s parliament’ is no more than fiction. The 
legislatures’ rhetoric of participatory democracy, linked to poorly implemented, and tokenistic 
participation processes that have very little, if any influence, and that seek to obscure a ‘system-
maintaining business-as-usual’507 agenda, do not come close to the standards of rights-based or 
deliberative participation, and they do not fool the public. Instead they increase the public’s 
distrust, loss of faith and frustration in politicians and in the system.508  
 
Although there is clearly truth to the question of if the legislatures are a white elephant that 
serves the executive and not the public; whatever their performance, they are intended to fulfil a 
fundamental role for state accountability and representing public interests in South Africa’s 
democracy. As with any human right, the right to participate will not materialise solely due to 
being articulated in the normative framework – rather it must be defended and claimed through 
ongoing political strategies of civil society. 
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